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I. INTRODUCTION

Montana's rule of civil procedure about the timing of the
issuance, service, and return of process is very different from the
federal rule and from the rules of most other states. Montana's
rule is difficult to find and, once found, is much more
complicated to read and to use than it needs to be. Numerous
cases in recent years bear witness to the confusion of the bar on
this seemingly simple aspect of beginning a civil lawsuit.
This article has three purposes. First, for practitioners
currently dealing with Rule 41(e) issues, it clarifies the current
requirements of the rule and makes some straightforward
practice suggestions. Second, the article examines the case law
in detail. The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted Rule
41(e) in 24 cases over the past 34 years, but the rule is so
complex that this judicial guidance itself contains numerous
contradictions and about-faces. With this understanding of the
Rule's history in Montana, I recommend several changes to the
rule and formulate three possible revisions. The Civil Rules
Commission recently approved one of the revisions proposed in
this article and forwarded it to the Montana Supreme Court.
The third purpose of this article is to assist the bar in
commenting on the proposed amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Rule 4 and Rule 41(e)
The purpose of both the Montana and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."'
In the change from code
pleading and practice, the federal rules model greatly reduced
the role of pleadings and increased the emphasis on trial on the
merits. Montana's rules are largely based on the federal model,
and most of them are similar, if not identical, to the

1.

MoNT. R. Civ. P. 1; FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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corresponding federal rules. 2 Pleadings are supposed to be
"short and plain,"3 containing just enough information to give
notice, so that the parties can get to the merits of the case easily
and quickly. Technical defects such as insufficiency of process
and insufficiency of service of process are disfavored and easily
4
waived if not raised at the beginning of the action.
A plaintiff needs to accomplish two steps at the beginning of
every lawsuit. First, the plaintiff must commence the action by
filing a complaint with the clerk of the court. 5 When the
complaint is filed and a docket opened, the court becomes aware
that there is a pending civil action which will eventually need
attention. Filing the complaint also stops the running of the
statute of limitations. 6 However, the mere filing of a complaint
does not notify the defendants that they have been sued and
that the court intends to render judgment on the dispute which
is the subject of the lawsuit.
The mechanism which
accomplishes these purposes is the summons, and having it
issued is the second step every plaintiff must complete.
"The purpose of serving a summons is to give notice to the

defendant and thereby afford him the opportunity to defend
himself or his property-an essential to due process of law."...
Service of process also provides the court with jurisdiction over the
person or entity sued .... Actual knowledge is not a substitute for
valid service.

7

Rule 4 is entitled "Persons Subject to JurisdictionProcess-Service." Rule 4 does deal with the issuance of the
summons and the manner in which it is to be served. Rule
4(b)(2) provides that "Lj]urisdiction may be acquired by our
courts over any person through the service of process as herein
provided." Rule 4 then goes on to specify the route a plaintiff
must follow in order to achieve this service of process: the
plaintiff (or plaintiffs attorney) presents a summons to the clerk
for issuance.8 The clerk issues the summons by signing it,

2. See infra note 442.
3. MONT.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (b); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (b).
4. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (g), (h)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (g), (h)(1).
5. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-102(1)(b) (1997).
6. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-102(1)(b) (1997).
7. Hadford v. Credit Bureau of Havre, Inc., 1998 MT 179,
16, 962 P.2d 1198,
1201 (1998) (quoting Haggerty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 396-97, 186
P.2d 884, 891 (1947)).
8. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 4C(1).
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attaching the court seal, and delivering it back to the plaintiff.9
It then is the responsibility of the plaintiff to serve the
defendant with the summons and complaint. 10 The remainder of
Rule 4 is devoted to describing the various methods for
accomplishing service on various defendants."
Despite its plethora of detail on who serves whom in what
manner, Montana's Rule 4 does not itself establish any
deadlines for accomplishing that service, leaving that to another
rule. Furthermore, for 36 years, Rule 4C made no mention at all
of the fact that another rule did establish time limits on the
issuance, service and return of process. In 1997, Rule 4C was
amended to add, inter alia: "Issuance, service and filing of the
served summons with the clerk shall be accomplished within the
-12
times prescribed by Rule 41(e) ....
Rule 41(e) is the unlikely location of some fairly stringent
requirements about the timing of issuance and service of the
summons. Buried deep in the Section of the Rules labeled
"Trials,"' 3 Rule 41 is entitled "Dismissal of Actions." The first
four sections of Rule 41 deal with events which occur well after
the institution of litigation: voluntary dismissal; involuntary
dismissal; 14 dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim; and costs of previously-dismissed action. Not until
its fifth subsection, 37 rules after the rule governing process and
service, does Rule 41 deal with the plaintiffs sprightliness at the
very outset of the lawsuit.
As the professor of civil procedure in Montana, I have
received frequent calls over the past 9 years from members of
the bar who vaguely recall that there is a rule somewhere which

9. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 4C(1), (2). See also Busch v. Atkinson, 278 Mont. 478, 925
P.2d 874 (1996).
10. "The party requesting issuance of the summons shall bear the burden of
having it properly and timely served and filed with the clerk." MONT. R. Civ. P. 4C(1).
11. MoNT. R. CIV. P. 4D describes both who may serve process (basically any adult
who is not a party to the action, including but not limited to sheriffs and their deputies)
and, situation by situation, exactly how they are to serve different categories of
defendants.
12. In re Amending Rule 4C(1) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 State
Rptr. 71 (1997). See also Supreme Court Amends Rule on Issuance of Summons, 22
MONT. LAWYER, Feb. 1997, at 12.
13. See MONT. R. Civ. P. Table of Rules: Part VI, Trials.
14. "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
the defendant.
Unless the court ... otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule.., operates as an
adjudication upon the merits." MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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limits the time in which to have summonses issued and served.
These callers invariably report that they have looked long and
hard in the rulebook, to no avail. The recent addition to Rule 4
of a clear reference to Rule 41(e) will go a long way, but not far
enough, to help lawyers find what should be straightforward
information.
It would be even better simply to relocate Rule 41(e), or at
least to repeat its requirements as part of Rule 4C and deal with
the subject as part of Rule 4, where it logically belongs.
However, a reading of Montana's 41(e) shows that its wording,
not just its mislocation in the rules, dooms the well-meaning
lawyer who tries to understand and follow its dictates. Rule
41(e), in its entirety, provides:
(e) Failure to Serve Summons. No action heretofore or hereafter
commenced shall be further prosecuted as to any defendant who

has not appeared in the action or been served in the action as
herein provided within three years after the action has been
commenced, and no further proceedings shall be had therein, and
all actions heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed
by the court in which the same shall have been commenced, on its
own motion, or on the motion of any party interested therein,
whether named
summons shall
summons issued
with the clerk

in the complaint as a party or not, unless
have been issued within 1 year, or unless
within 1 year shall have been served and filed
of the court within three years after the

commencement of said action, or unless appearance has been
made by the defendant or defendants therein within said three
years. When more than one defendant has been named in an
action, the action may within the discretion of the trial court be
further prosecuted against any defendant who has appeared
within three years, or upon whom summons which has been issued
within 1 year has been served and filed with the clerk within three
years as herein required.

There is only one intelligent response to a first reading of
this rule: "HUH?" Could this possibly be described as Plain
English for Lawyers, much less for anyone else who might
attempt to divine the requirements imposed by this rule? 15 In
fact, the requirements of the rules can be stated affirmatively,

15. One legal scholar laments that "[in particular, statutes and regulations grind
on, line after line, perhaps on the theory that if readers come to a period they will rush
out to violate the law without bothering to read the end." RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN
ENGLISH FOR LAwYERS 33 (3d ed. 1994). Mhe remedy is simple. Instead of one long
sentence containing five thoughts, use five sentences, each containing one thought." Id.
at 35. Or, in Hemingway's words, "Prose is architecture, not interior decoration, and the
Baroque is over." ERNEST HEMINGWAY, DEATH INTHE AFTERNOON 191 (1932).
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and turn out to be quite simple:
1. The plaintiff must have a summons issued by the clerk
within one year of the time the original complaint is filed;
2. The plaintiff must serve the defendant with that
summons within three years of the time the original
complaint is filed;
3. The plaintiff must file the returned summons with the
clerk of court, also within three years of the time the
original complaint is filed; or, if conditions 1 through 3
are not met,
4. The defendant must appear in the action within three
16
years of the time the original complaint is filed.
The penalty for violating these requirements also can be
stated clearly. If the plaintiff misses any of these deadlines with
regard to any defendant, and if that defendant does not appear
within the three-year deadline, the court must dismiss the
action against that defendant. The court may act on its own
motion or on that of any interested party.
Compared to Montana's convolution, the Federal Rules are
breathtakingly simple and deal with the subject as part of Rule
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) is clearly and accurately entitled "Time
Limit for Service." It provides:
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint, the court,
upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff,

shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or
direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided
that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall
extend the time for service for an appropriate period ....

B. Legislative History of Rule 41(e)
Montana's Rule 41(e), as noted above, simply does not exist
in the federal version of the Rules of Civil Procedure; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41 has only four subsections, (a) through (d). Montana
added its subsection (e) to the federal rule when Montana
adopted its current Rules of Civil Procedure. The Montana
addition came from a pre-existing Montana statute, adopted as
16. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(e). See also Sinclair v. Big Bud Mfg., 262 Mont. 363,
367, 865 P.2d 264, 267 (1993) (permitting prosecution of action against defendant who
appeared within three years even though the summons was not timely issued), infra
Section IV.A.13.
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part of Montana's original legislation at Bannock in 1895.17 It
appears, in turn, that the Bannock version of this rule came to
us from California,' 8 which continues to be the only other state
in the union with a procedural oddity anything like Rule 41(e). 19
When Montana began to consider changing from Code
pleading and practice to a federal rules model, the rules drafters
originally left out the statutory deadline for service of process.
Rule 41(e) did not appear in the original proposed Rules of Civil
Procedure which were compiled and promulgated by the
Montana Civil Rules Committee; 20 at that point, neither Rule 41
nor Rule 4 contained any time limit for service of process. 21 In
1963, two years after the first version of the new Montana Rules
of Civil Procedure was adopted, the 38th Legislative Assembly
approved a statute adding subsection (e) to Rule 41.22 At that
time, Rule 41(e) simply established a three-year limit for service,
without any specific deadline for obtaining a summons:
No action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be further
prosecuted, and no further proceedings shall be had therein, and
all actions heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed
by the court in which the same shall have been commenced on its
own motion, or on the motion of any party interested therein,
whether named in the complaint as a party or not, unless
summons shall have been served and return made within three
years after the commencement of said action, or unless appearance
has been made by the defendant or defendants therein within said
23
three years.

This rule tracks California's three year limit. 24
The first amendment to Rule 41(e) by the Montana Supreme
Court became effective on July 1, 1965.25 This amendment

17. MONT. CODE CIV. P. § 1004(7) (1895) required that summons be issued within
one year after filing the complaint and service made and returned within three years
after filing the complaint. Later legislative histories list the California Civil Code as the
source of this provision. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 9317 (Smith 1921).
18. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 9317 (Smith 1921).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 467-475 (discussing California's present

practice).
20. See Proposed Official Draft of Mont. R. Civ. P. 41 (1959).
21. See Proposed Official Draft of Mont. R. Civ. P. 4 (1959).
22. See Act of Mar. 1, 1963, 1963 Mont. Laws 216.
23. 1963 Mont. Laws 216, 218.
24. The three-year deadline for service of summons first appears in Section 1004 of
the 1895 Montana Code of Civil Procedure. Later legislative histories list the California
Civil Code section 581 as the source of the change. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
9317 (Smith 1921).
25. See Montana Supreme Court Order No. 10750, Apr. 1, 1965.
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added the one-year limit for the issuance of the summons and
began the trend away from clarity and toward confusion of the
bar by using very complicated language. 26 The Rule then read:
No action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be further
prosecuted as to any defendant who has not appeared in the action
or been served in the action as herein provided within three years
after the action has been commenced, and no further proceedings
shall be had therein, and all action heretofore or hereafter
commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same
shall have been commenced on its own motion, or on the motion of
any party interested therein, whether named in the complaint as a
party or not, unless summons shall have been issued within one
year, or unless summons issued within one year shall have been
served and return made and filed with the clerk of the court
within three years after the commencement of said action, or
unless appearance has been made by the defendant or defendants
27
therein within said three years.

Thus, the current Rule 41(e) was born. Another amendment
occurred in 1993, adding even more text to the rule:
When more than one defendant has been named in an action, the
action may within the discretion of the trial court be further
prosecuted against any defendant who has appeared within three
years, or upon whom summons has been issued within 1 year has
been served and filed with the clerk within three years as herein
28
required.
III. INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR COMPLYING WITH RULE 41(e)

Although the requirements of obtaining a summons within
one year and serving it within three years from the date of filing
the complaint do not seem unduly burdensome, Rule 41(e) has
generated a disproportionately large amount of litigation. From
the adoption of this rule in 1963 through December of 1998,
some 35 years, the Montana Supreme Court has decided 24
26. The Commission Comment to this amendment suggests the opposite,
apparently believing that the change made the situation clearer. The Comment stated:
This clarifies and brings together the laches provisions with respect to issuance
and service of summons. At present Rules 4C(1), 41(e), Section 93-3002 R.C.M.
1947, and Rule 12(b) all need to be referred to. This amendment incorporates
the laches provision of Section 93-4705(7), R.C.M. 1947, which was repealed by
chapter 13 of the 1961 Session Laws.
MoNT. R. Civ. P. 41(e) Commission's Note to 1965 amendment.
27. Montana Supreme Court Order No. 10750, Apr. 1, 1965.
28. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 41(e) (1993). See also Montana Supreme Court Order of Mar.
26, 1993.
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cases in which Rule 41(e) was raised. 29 Federal courts also have
had to interpret and apply this rule. 30 In most of these cases,
lawyers simply missed one deadline or another and then thrust
themselves on the mercy of the courts, with varying degrees of
success.
To get a true sense of the confusion engendered by Rule
41(e) itself, its use or misuse by lawyers, and the conflicting
judicial treatment of the rule by the courts, it is best to survey
the cases in some detail and in chronological order. I present
such a survey in the following section. As the cases illustrate,
both plaintiffs and defendants can make grievous Rule 41(e)
errors which may govern the outcome of their cases. First,
however, because the language of the rule is so dense and its
interpretation so important, I have synthesized the rule and
cases into several short requirements for both plaintiffs and
defendants. The source of each of the following guidelines is
given in footnotes so that the reader can readily identify the
particular cases dealing with the specific issue.
A. Plaintiffs Counsel
1.

Obtain a summons addressed to each defendant, including

29. Quamme v. Jodsaas, 1998 MT 341, 970 P.2d 1049 (1998); Schmitz v. Vasquez,
1998 MT 314, 970 P.2d 103 (1998); MacPheat v. Schauf, 1998 MT 250, 969 P.2d 265
(1998); Hadford v. Credit Bureau of Havre, Inc., 1998 MT 179, 962 P.2d 1198 (1998);
Eddleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1998 MT 52, 955 P.2d 646 (1998); Rocky Mountain
Enter., Inc. v. Pierce Flooring, 286 Mont. 282, 951 P.2d 1326 (1997); Yarborough v.
Glacier County, 285 Mont. 494, 948 P.2d 1181 (1997); Haugen v. Blaine Bank of
Montana, 279 Mont. 1, 926 P.2d 1364 (1996); Busch v. Atkinson, 278 Mont. 478, 925 P.2
874 (1996); Webb v. T.D., 275 Mont. 243, 912 P.2d 202 (1996); First Call, Inc. v. Capital
Answering Service, Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 898 P.2d 96 (1995); Sinclair v. Big Bud Mfg. Co.,
262 Mont. 363, 865 P.2d 264 (1993); Courchane v. Kuntz, 246 Mont. 216, 806 P.2d 12
(1990); Livingston v. Treasure County, 239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989); Association
of Unit Owners v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 224 Mont. 142, 729 P.2d 469 (1986); Sooy v.
Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014 (1985); Larango v. Lovely, 196
Mont. 43, 637 P.2d 517 (1981); Brymerski v. City of Great Falls, 195 Mont. 428, 636 P.2d
846 (1981); Rierson v. State, 188 Mont. 522, 614 P.2d 1020 (1980); Shields v. Pirkle
Refrigerated Freightlines, Inc., 181 Mont. 37, 591 P.2d 1120(1979); State ex rel. Equity
Supply Co. v. District Court of Eleventh Jud. Dist., 159 Mont. 34, 494 P.2d 911 (1972);
Werning v. McFarland, 149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851 (1967); State ex rel. Belwin, Inc. v.
Davison, 148 Mont. 345, 420 P.2d 842 (1966); Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 399
P.2d 757 (1965).
30. See Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., No. 97-35418, 162 F.3d 1167, 1998 WL
746051 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998) (unpublished table decision). MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(e) is a
procedural rule and so not binding on a federal court in a diversity action. However, the
federal court may have to determine the consequences of a 41(e) violation if it allegedly
occurred before the action was removed from state to federal court. See infra Section
IV.B.
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any newly discovered or identified defendants, within one
year from the date the original complaint is filed. 31 This
should be done routinely on the date the complaint is filed.
2.

3.

Serve the summons and complaint upon each defendant
within three years from the date the original complaint is
filed. 32 To avoid the gamble which plaintiffs lost in the
Haugen case, a prudent practitioner should calendar both
issuance and location of the original summons before the
end of the first year of the litigation, to allow time to have a
duplicate issued before that year expires if the first
33
summons is lost.
File the served summons within three years from the time
the complaint was filed.34 A prudent practitioner should file
35
both the served summons and the return of service.

4.

Do not rely on Rule 41(e) as authority for timeliness in
administrative, 36 probate, 37 or other specialized proceedings.

5.

Do not rely on compliance with 41(e) as a defense to a Rule
41(b) motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. 38

6.

If plaintiff loses the original summons before service, he/she
may obtain a duplicate summons, so long as that summons
is virtually identical to the original issued within the first
year, and the duplicate is then served within the three year
39
period.

31. See MONT. R. CIV. P. 4. For a discussion of problems arising with ficitiously
named defendants, see Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014
(1985), infra Section IV.A.9.
32. See MONT. R. CIV. P. 4.
33. See Haugen v. Blaine Bank of Montana, 279 Mont. 1, 926 P.2d 1364 (1996),
infra Section IV.A.17.
34. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 4.
35. The language of the Rule was amended in 1993 to require the "summons issued
within 1 year shall have been served and filed with the Clerk of Court within three
years...." See Montana Supreme Court Order of Mar. 26, 1993. This deletes earlier
language requiring filing of the return of service, but does not meet the criticism of
Livingston v. Treasure County, 239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989) (excusing late
return of service made three years and three weeks after complaint filed on ground that
late filing of return of service does not prejudice the defendant), infra Section V.A. 11.
36. Rierson v. State, 188 Mont. 522, 614 P.2d 1020 (1980), infra Section IV.A.6.
37. Werning v. McFarland, 149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851 (1967), infra Section
IV.A.3.
38. See Brymerski v. City of Great Falls, 195 Mont. 428, 636 P.2d 846 (1981), infra
Section IV.A.7.
39. See Yarbrough v. Glacier County, 285 Mont. 494, 948 P.2d 1181 (1997), infra
Section IV.A.18; see also Association of Unit Owners v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 224
Mont. 142, 148, 729 P.2d 469, 472 (1986) (expressly disapproving a duplicate summons
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7.

Plaintiff may amend, with leave of court, the original
summons so that it correctly reflects changed circumstances
since the original summons was issued, such as dropping or
40
adding parties or changing counsel.

8.

Plaintiff may re-serve a timely summons within the three
year period if defendant objects to the service of a late41
issued summons.
If the first summons is returned unserved, it becomes
functus officio.
Plaintiff should request an additional
summons pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 4C(1).42

9.

B. Defense Counsel
1.
2.

3.

Check the date of issuance of the summons and its service
before making any appearance whatsoever in the case.' 3
If the plaintiff has violated Rule 41(e), include that violation
as a basis for dismissal in the first appearance," moving to
dismiss for both insufficiency of process and insufficiency of
45
service of process.
If you see that the plaintiff is going to violate either the
deadline for issuance of a summons or the deadline for

as unprecedented in Montana's rule or cases), infra Section IV.A.10.
40. See MONT. R. CIV. P. 4D(7); Larango v. Lovely, 196 Mont. 43, 637 P.2d 517
(1981), infra Section IV.A.8; Schmitz v. Vasquez, 1998 MT 314, 970 P.2d 1039 (1998),
infra Section IV.A.23.
41. See Rocky Mountain Enter., Inc. v. Pierce Flooring, 286 Mont. 282, 951 P.2d
1326 (1997), infra Section LV.A.19.
42. See MacPheat v. Schauf, 1998 MT 250, 969 P.2d 265 (1998), infra Section
IV.A.22.
43. See Sinclair v. Big Bud Mfg., 262 Mont. 363, 367, 865 P.2d 264, 267 (1993)
(permitting prosecution of action against defendant who appeared within three years
even though summons was not issued on time), infra Section V.A. 13.
44. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not themselves define "appearance." In
Montana state district court practice, the most common first document filed is a routine
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), even if in fact this motion is groundless. The
Uniform District Court Rules, which supplement the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure,
specifically recognize this practice, simply stating that a motion unsupported by brief or
affidavits will be denied. See MONT. UNIF. DIST. CT. R. 21(b). Furthermore, the
Commission Comment to MONT. R. CIrv. P. 11 exempts this "empty" Rule 12(b)(6) motion
from Rule l's certification requirement, acknowledging and affirming its widespread
use to gain more time to file a substantive response to the complaint. Nonetheless, such
a motion clearly does constitute an appearance by the defendant and, without inclusion
of a Rule 41(e) ground for dismissal, should waive the Rule 41(e) defenses.
See
Association of Unit Owners v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 224 Mont. 152, 729 P.2d 469
(1986), infra Section IV.A.10.
45. See infra note 53.
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service of that summons, be sure to wait until after the
46
deadline has expired to file your motion for dismissal.
4.

Be sure that any involuntary dismissal for violation of Rule
41(e) specifically states that it is with prejudice and is given
47
res judicata effect.
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF RULE 41(e):
GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT

A. Rule 41(e) in the Montana Supreme Court
48

1. Whitcraft v. Semenza.
Whitcraft was the first Montana Supreme Court case
construing Rule 41(e). 49 In that case, the plaintiff obtained a
summons on the same day she filed her complaint, October 21,
1960.50
However, the summons was returned unserved in
1962.51 Alias summonses in the names of two defendants were
issued in 1964, and both were served in that same year. 52 The
defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12, alleging
53
insufficiency of service of process and insufficiency of process
46. See Haugen v. Blaine Bank, 279 Mont. 1, 926 P.2d 1364 (1996), infra Section
IV.A.17.
47. See First Call, Inc. v. Capital Answering Service, Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 898 P.2d
96 (1995), infra Section IV.A.14. First Call overrules Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont.
94, 399 P.2d 757 (1965), infra Section IV.A.1. See also Equity Supply Co. v. District
Court, 159 Mont. 34, 494 P.2d 911 (1972), infra Section V.A.4.
48. 145 Mont. 94, 399 P.2d 757 (1965).
49. Several prior cases relied upon MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-4705(7) (1947), the
statutory precursor to the current Rule 41(e). See, e.g., In re W. D. Hirst, 140 Mont. 91,
368 P.2d 157 (1962) (disciplining lawyer for negligence for failing to collect a client's
debt, in part by failing to comply with MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-4705(7) (1947));
Kujich v. Lillie, 127 Mont. 125, 260 P.2d 383 (1953); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Fourteenth
Judicial District, 142 Mont. 64, 381 P.2d 473 (1963). These cases are not discussed in any
detail in this article.
50. See Whitcraft, 145 Mont. at 95, 399 P.2d at 758.
51.
52.

See id.
See id.

53. It is not clear whether a violation of Rule 41(e) constitutes insufficiency of
process, a Rule 12(b)(4) defense, or insufficiency of service of process, a Rule 12(b)(5)
defense. Logically, it appears that failing to have the summons issued in time would be
insufficiency of process, whereas a delay in serving a duly issued summons would be
insufficient service. Most defendants avoid this quandary by simply raising both
grounds in one combined Rule 12 motion to dismiss, as authorized by Rule 12(g). See,
e.g., Whitcraft, 145 Mont. at 95, 399 P.2d at 758; Busch v. Atkinson, 278 Mont. 478, 481,
925 P.2d 874, 876 (1996); Sinclair v. Big Bud Mfg. Co., 262 Mont. 363, 365, 865 P.2d 264,
266 (1995). But see Association of Unit Owners v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 224 Mont.
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because of the alleged violation of the time requirements of Rule
41(e). 54 The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and
55
the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.
The court recognized that Rule 41(e) in Montana did not
exist in the Federal Rules, after which most of the Montana
rules are patterned, and spent some time explicating the origin
of Rule 41(e):
Section 93-4705, R.C.M. 1947, was practically identical with Rule
41(e), the difference not being material to our discussion here, and
was the law of Montana for over 65 years, until its repeal at the
time of the adoption of the new Rules. It was inserted in the Rules
at the next session of the Legislature in 1963.56

The court also stated the reason for adding this subsection
to Rule 41:
It must be borne in mind that the Rule is nothing more than a rule
of procedure, designed to encourage promptness in the prosecution
of actions .... [A] judgment is not res judicata
unless it is on the
57
merits, and a dismissal under the Rule is not.

Finally, the court expressed irritation with the plaintiffs'
argument that they ought not be held to the time limits
established in Rule 41(e) because the rule was not adopted until
after they had begun the lawsuit:
Rule 41(e) became effective July 1, 1963, though it was passed by
the Legislature and approved by the Governor on March 1, 1963.
During April of 1963, twenty-six seminars were held by justices of
this court in Montana to acquaint all lawyers with the changes in
the Rules made by the 1963 Legislative Assembly, and
mimeographed copies of all changes.., were distributed ....
Special attention was paid at every seminar to the addition to
Rule 41 of sub-section (e). In our view not only was a reasonable
time allowed before the effective date of the change, but the
information was widely distributed so that every attorney in the
58
state would be informed.

Thus, Whitcraft became the first case to dismiss an action
142, 148, 729 P.2d 469, 472 (1986) (characterizing plaintiffs' violation of Rule 41(e) as
insufficient service of process rather than insufficient process).
54. See Whitcraft, 145 Mont. at 95, 399 P.2d at 758.
55. See id. at 100, 399 P.2d at 760.
56. Id. at 96, 399 P.2d at 759.
57. Id. The Montana Supreme Court overruled Whitcraft with respect to the res
judicata issue in First Call, Inc. v. CapitalAnswering Service, Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 428,
898 P.2d 96, 98 (1995), infra Section IV.A.14.
58. Whitcraft, 145 Mont. at 99, 399 P.2d at 761.
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for violation of Rule 41(e)'s deadlines.
2. State ex rel. Belwin v. Davison.59
Belwin also involved an application of the rule shortly after
its adoption. The plaintiff obtained the summons on the 364th
60
day after the complaint was filed, in compliance with the rule.
However, the defendant was not served with the summons until
three years and one week had elapsed from the filing of the
complaint. 61 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss for violation of Rule 41(e), apparently on the ground
that the original complaint was filed more than a month before
Rule 41(e) became effective. 62 The Supreme Court held that
Rule 41(e) nonetheless applied to this action 63 and that the
district court acted outside its jurisdiction in denying the motion
to dismiss. 64 The Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition
directing the trial court to enter an order dismissing the
action. 65
66
3. Werning v. McFarland.
Less than three months later, in Werning, the Supreme
Court faced a plaintiff who had obtained a summons the same
day the complaint was filed, October 22, 1965, and served that
summons on the defendant less than three months later, on

January 17, 1966.67 The plaintiff flourished his compliance with

Rule 41(e) as a shield to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff
had waited too long to prosecute his action. 68 The Supreme
Court agreed that the plaintiff had met the requirements of Rule
41(e) but held that Rule 41(e) did not apply to an action against
an executrix based on a rejected claim against the estate:
The basic question is whether the failure of appellant to make
service of the summons on the respondent before the final decree
[of distribution] and discharge bars this action. We hold that it
does .... Allowing the appellant up to three years to make service
59. 148 Mont. 345, 420 P.2d 842 (1966).
60. See id. at 346, 420 P.2d at 843.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 346, 420 P.2d at 843-44.
63. See id. at 347-48, 420 P.2d at 844. "We deem rule 41(e) is applicable in this
case. Rule 41(e) refers clearly to actions 'heretofore or hereafter commenced'... and
therefore applies to actions filed before the effective date." Id.
64. See id. at 348, 420 P.2d at 844.
65. See id.
66. 149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851 (1967).
67. See id. at 139, 423 P.2d at 852.
68. See id.
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of summons would place an unreasonable burden on probate
procedure and would ignore the purpose for which [Mont. Rev.
Code Ann.] section 91-2709 [1947169 was enacted. That section
creates a special limitation on the type of suit before us ....
Nominal adherence to the requirement to "bring suit" (by filing a
complaint), without service of 0 summons, is not substantial
compliance with section 91-2709.7

Again, the court applied a time limitation on the service of
summons on the defendant to defuse a plaintiffs claim on
procedural grounds, but held here that Rule 41(e)'s limits did
not apply to a probate matter and thus applied a tighter
deadline.
71
4. State ex rel. Equity Supply Co. v. DistrictCourt.
Five years later, a violation of Rule 41(e) caused the loss of
another claim. The motor vehicle collision at issue in Equity
Supply occurred on January 31, 1964.72 The plaintiffs filed a
complaint in Flathead County on January 27, 1967, within the
statute of limitations period, but never had a summons issued
on that complaint. 73 The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,
seeking identical damages, on March 3, 1969 and had a
summons issued the same day. 74 That summons was served on
the defendant on March 4, 1969, more than 5 years after the
accident, but less than three years after the original complaint
75
was filed.

69. This section required a claimant to "bring suit in the proper court against the
executor or administrator within three (3) months after the date such rejected claim is
filed." Id. at 139, 423 P.2d at 852. In Werning, the plaintiff did file the complaint within
the three month period, but did not serve it on the executrix for almost three more
months, until after defendant had been discharged from her duties as executrix. The
claimant argued that merely filing the complaint constituted "bringing the suit." The
Supreme Court stated that filing a complaint without service of summons was not
substantial compliance with MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 91-2709 (1947). See Werning, 149
Mont. at 140, 423 P.2d at 852.
70. Werning, 149 Mont. at 139-40, 420 P.2d at 852.
71. 159 Mont. 34, 494 P.2d 911 (1972), overruled in part by First Call, Inc. v.
Capital Answering Service, Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 428, 898 P.2d 96, 98 (1995), infra
Section IV.A.14.
72. See Equity Supply, 159 Mont. at 35, 494 P.2d at 912.
73. See id. at 35, 494 P.2d at 912.
74.

See id.

75. See id. In addition to the validity of the summons, the court also discussed the
history of Rule 41(e) and its statutory precursor, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-4705(7)
(1947). See Equity Supply, 159 Mont. at 36-37, 494 P.2d at 912. The court said that §
93-4705(7) "specifically provided for the dismissal of actions wherein summons had not
been issued within one year" and added:
This statute was repealed in 1961, concurrently with the adoption of the Rules
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The district court dismissed the action on the basis of Rule
41(e), holding that no summons was issued within one year of
the filing of the original complaint, and that issuing a summons
on the amended complaint more than one year after the filing of
the original complaint was improper. 76 The plaintiffs then filed
a new action altogether, based on the same accident and
"identical in all ways to the previously dismissed action." 77 The
defendant moved for summary judgment on its affirmative
defenses of statute of limitations and res judicata. 78 The district
court denied summary judgment, citing this language from
79
Whitcraft:
[Tihe Rule is nothing more than a rule of procedure, designed to
encourage promptness in the prosecution of actions.... While an
action may be dismissed the claim remains. An order of dismissal
is not res judicata, it does not constitute a bar to another suit on
the same claim. It is a fundamental rule that a judgment is not
res judicata unless it is on the merits, and a dismissal under the
80
Rule is not.

The district court then held that because the Rule 41(e)
dismissal was not caused by neglect to prosecute the action, the
plaintiffs were entitled to an extension of the statute of
limitations for the filing of a new action under Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. § 93-2708 (1947).81

82
The defendant then sought a writ of supervisory control.

of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(e), which has no counterpart in the Federal Rules,

was adopted in 1963, and it provided that unless summons shall have been
served and return made within three years after commencement of the action,
the action should be dismissed. Rule 41(e) was again amended in 1965, but the
1963 rule came out of old Section 93-4705.
Equity Supply, 159 Mont. at 36, 494 P.2d at 912.
76. See Equity Supply, 159 Mont. at 37, 494 P.2d at 912.
77. Id. at 37, 494 P.2d at 913.
78. See id.
79.

See Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 96-97, 399 P.2d 757, 759 (1965), supra

Section IV.A.1.
80. Equity Supply, 159 Mont. at 40-41, 494 P.2d at 914.
81. See id. at 37, 494 P.2d at 913. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-2708 (1947) is now
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-407 (1997). It provides:
If an action is commenced within the time limited therefor and a judgment
therein is reversed on appeal.., or the action is terminated in any other
manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for
neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the
plaintiff... may commence a new action for the same cause after the
expiration of the time so limited and within one year after such a reversal or
termination.
82.

See Equity Supply, 159 Mont. at 35, 494 P.2d at 911.
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The Montana Supreme Court issued the writ, directing the trial
court to dismiss the second action.8 3 The court limited the
Whitcraft language to its specific context and further stated:
As Rule 41(e) is now written, an order of dismissal is a bar to
another suit on the same claim, if, as here, the statute of
limitations as well as the period provided for by the rule, have run.
Section 93-2708, R.C.M. 1947, as quoted previously, has been
limited to that extent by the application of Rule 41.... [S]uch
delay in prosecution should not be tolerated, and is not under our
law. Rule 41(e) is explicit .... Any other interpretation would
make Rule 41, M.R.Civ.P., and its subdivisions meaningless and
they would simply become technical defects which could be
endlessly corrected upon being called to the attention of the Court.
Having found that section 93-2708, R.C.M. 1947, does not
operate to save a claim where the failure to have summons issued
within the statutory period of limitations has occurred, it then
follows that the [decision below] should be reversed ....
84

Justice Haswell issued a special concurrence, arguing that
the same result should occur even if the statute of limitations
had not expired. "In my view, a dismissal under Rule 41(e)
operates independently of any statute of limitations, and a
dismissal thereunder ...bars a subsequent action between the
85
same parties on the same claim."
86
5. Shields v. Pirkle RefrigeratedFreightlines,Inc.
Justice Haswell wrote the opinion for a unanimous court in
the next Rule 41(e) case. The plaintiff obtained a summons at or
near the time he filed his complaint, but did not personally serve
the corporate defendants. 87 Instead, plaintiffs counsel filed an
affidavit asserting that the two corporations could not be found
or served in Montana, and served the summons and complaint
on the Secretary of State.8 8 The affidavit deviated in several
respects from the requirements of Rule 4D for substituted
service.8 9 Furthermore, at the time the affidavit was filed, one

83. See id. at 41, 494 P.2d at 914-15.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 42, 494 P.2d at 915 (Haswell, J., concurring in the judgment). This
dissenting opinion ascended into the majority view 23 years later, in First Call Inc. v.
Capital Answering Service, Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 898 P.2d 96 (1995), infra Section
IV.A.14.
86. 181 Mont. 37, 591 P.2d 1120 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Roberts v.
Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 276 Mont. 225, 228, 915 P.2d 872, 873 (1996).
87. See id. at 38, 591 P.2d at 1121.
88. See id. at 38-39, 591 P.2d at 1121.
89. See id. at 39, 591 P.2d at 1121.
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of the corporations was in fact incorporated in Montana.90 Its
annual report was on record and listed the names and addresses
of its officers and registered agent. 91
When the registered agent (who was also counsel for the
corporation) received the summons and complaint from the
Secretary of State, he advised the corporation that he thought
the substituted service was defective and did not confer
jurisdiction over the defendant. 92 Based on this advice, the
defendant chose not to appear in the action. 93 The trial judge
entered a default judgment against that defendant.9 4 Exactly
three years after the entry of the default judgment, the
95
defendant moved for, and obtained, relief from that judgment.
Although the Supreme Court observed that "[tihere is no
explanation anywhere in the record why Western Supply, Inc.
waited three years before taking steps to invalidate the default
judgment,"96 it is obvious that the default and the subsequent
three year wait were intentional. If the defendant had moved
for dismissal for lack of proper service, rather than opting for a
default, the plaintiff would have learned of his own error and
been able to reserve the summons within the three-year limit
imposed by Rule 41(e). By waiting for three years to pass before
challenging the default, the defendant made this remedy
impossible.
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Lessley that the
default judgment was void for failure of service of process
because of the variations from the requirements of Rule 4.97 It
also announced a new rule, that orders granting motions to
vacate default judgments are generally nonappealable, but
noted that there were certain exceptions to that rule:
The basis for the holdings that an order setting aside a default
judgment is not appealable is that such orders are interlocutory in
character, merely leaving the parties in a position to try the case.
This... does not apply where the order sets aside the default on
jurisdictional grounds that do not admit of correction. Such an
order, in effect, finally concludes the case and the rights of the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See

id.
id.
id. at 39, 591 P.2d at 1121-22.
id. at 39, 591 P.2d at 1122.
id.
id.
id. at 43, 591 P.2d at 1123-24.
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98
parties; that is, it becomes a final judgment.

The court then pointed out that if service was in fact not
properly made in this case, Rule 41(e) rendered that defect
uncorrectable because it provided "for dismissal of an action
where, as here, no service or return has been made within three
years after commencement of the action."99 Because the threeyear lapse made proper service impossible so that there never
could be jurisdiction over the defendant, "the order of the
District Court vacating the default judgment amounts to a final
judgment from which an appeal can be taken." 100
Thus, although the plaintiffs attempted service met the
time limits of Rule 41(e), the defendant was still able to
successfully brandish the rule as a sword rather than a shield.
Defense counsel's knowledge of both Rule 4 and Rule 41(e) and
his exploitation of plaintiff's relatively minor errors allowed the
defendant to avoid trial on the merits.
6. Rierson v. State.1 1
The Supreme Court decided three more Rule 41(e) cases in
the two years after Shields. Rierson centered around a highway
patrolman's retirement benefits.
After the administrative
agency denied his petition, the officer filed a petition for judicial
review of the agency's determination. 10 2
The Montana
Administrative Procedure Act provides that once such a petition
is filed, it must be "promptly served." 10 3 The plaintiff obtained a
summons when he filed his petition but did not serve it. 1° 4 He
then returned that summons unserved, filed an amended
petition and obtained an amended summons, and served the
amended petition and summons more than sixteen months after
10 5
filing his complaint.
The Board of Administration moved to dismiss the petition
for insufficiency of process. 10 6 The trial court entered an order
dismissing both petitions with prejudice. 0 7 When the plaintiff
98. Id. at 42, 591 P.2d at 1123.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 43, 591 P.2d at 1123.
101.
188 Mont. 522, 614 P.2d 1020 (1980).
102. See id. at 525, 614 P.2d at 1022.
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1997); Rierson, 188 Mont. at 525, 614 P.2d
at 1022-23.
104. See Rierson, 188 Mont. at 525, 614 P.2d at 1022.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 525, 614 P.2d at 1022-23.
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appealed, the Supreme Court held that the "prompt service"
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act applied, rather
than the three-year service provision in Rule 41(e), and that a
sixteen and one-half month delay between filing and service was
08
not reasonable under the circumstances.
As in Werning v. McFarland,0 9 Rierson tried to use the
liberal three-year service provision in Rule 41(e) as a defense
against a claim that he had been dilatory in serving formal
process on the defendant. 110 As in Werning, the Supreme Court
applied the more stringent particular requirement established
by statute for the specific type of action,"' and, as in all the Rule
41(e) cases to this point, the Rierson majority had no difficulty
enforcing a stated time limit on service, to the detriment of the
plaintiff.
Justice Sheehy dissented in Rierson, focusing on the
substantive wrong which he perceived the Public Employees'
Retirement Board had perpetrated upon the patrolman." 2 He
argued that the Board had attempted to exercise judicial power
unconstitutionally" 3 and that the plaintiff would have been
entitled to bring an original proceeding for a writ of certiorari
rather than pursue administrative review. 114
"We should
therefore not kick him out of court on a procedural point relating
to administrative review when the same procedure would be
acceptable had his petition been confined to the judicial
issues. "115 Justice Sheehy also would have applied Rule 41(e)
rather than the imprecise directive of the APA regarding
"prompt" service. 116
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Rierson dealt with
the facts that the original summons, which was issued within

108. Acknowledging that appellate courts do not usually establish exact time limits
where the legislature has not done so, the Montana Supreme Court stated:
However, for the sake of guidance in the future, we note that service of a
petition for judicial review within thirty days, or thereabouts, from the time
the petition was filed in District Court should not result in a dismissal for
failure to comply with section 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA.
Rierson, 188 Mont. at 528, 614 P.2d at 1024.
109.
149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851 (1967), supra Section IV.A.3.
110. See Rierson, 188 Mont. at 527, 614 P.2d at 1023-24.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 529-33, 614 P.2d at 1024-27 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 529-30, 614 P.2d at 1024-25.
114. See id. at 530, 614 P.2d at 1025.
115. Id. at 531, 614 P.2d at 1025.
116. See id. at 531, 533, 614 P.2d at 1026, 1027.
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one year of the original district court petition, was never served
and that the "amended summons" which was served was not
issued within one year of the filing of the original petition. It
seems that because of this chronology, even if the court had
applied the time constraints of Rule 41(e) to this administrative
review, the plaintiff would have been in violation of the Rule.
The court was squarely faced, and summarily dealt, with the
inventive procedure of obtaining "amended summonses" in order
to get around Rule 41(e) six years later, in Association of Unit
117
Owners v. Big Sky.
118
7. Brymerski v. City of GreatFalls.
Brymerski objected to the dismissal of the action under Rule
41(b) for failure to prosecute. 119 Among the five issues raised on
appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the district court should
have considered the time periods set out in Rule 41(e) when
deciding whether plaintiffs had in fact failed to prosecute their
action. 120 Although the Supreme Court did not address this
issue, the plaintiffs apparently were arguing that their
compliance with Rule 41(e) per se meant that they had not failed
to prosecute. The Supreme Court was able to resolve this case
without reference to Rule 41(e), adopting the rule that "a motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute will not be granted if the
plaintiff is diligently prosecuting his claim at the time the
motion is filed, even if at some earlier time the plaintiff may
121
have failed to act with due diligence."
Interestingly, the Brymerski court supported its holding
with the public policy in favor of trial on the merits, a public
policy which it had not cited in any of the Rule 41(e) cases to
date:

If a plaintiff has actively resumed the prosecution of a case, the
policy favoring resolution of a case on its merits is more
compelling than the policy underlying Rule 41(b) which is to
prevent unreasonable delays.122

117.
P.2d 469
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Association of Unit Owners v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 224 Mont. 142, 729
(1986), infra Section IV.A.10.
195 Mont. 428, 636 P.2d 846 (1981).
See id. at 429-30, 636 P.2d at 847-48.
See id. at 430-31, 636 P.2d at 848.
Id. at 432, 636 P.2d at 848-49.
Id. at 432, 636 P.2d at 847.
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8. Larango v. Lovely.123
Like Werning v. McFarland,124 Larango involved a probate.
Allegedly, the personal representative disregarded instructions
that the oil, gas, and mineral rights to parcels of land in the
estate had already been alienated, and thus were not to be
conveyed. 125 In an earlier opinion, the Montana Supreme Court
held the purported conveyances by the personal representative
invalid. 126 While that appeal was pending, the aggrieved heirs
retained an attorney to sue the personal representative for
negligence. 127 The original complaint, filed May 8, 1978, and a
summons issued that same day128 clearly met the first deadline
imposed by Rule 41(e).
Before the summons was served, however, the plaintiffs
changed lawyers. 129 The new attorney altered the summons in
several respects, mostly to correct the names of the plaintiffs,
before serving it on May 17, 1979.130 The alterations were made
without leave of court. 131 On the following day, the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint which contained the changes made
in the amended summons as well as others: new claims for
excess fees and for an accounting for the crops on one parcel of
land, and a change from suing the defendant as personal
representative to suing the defendant personally. 132
The
defendant quickly moved to quash the service of the altered
summons. 133 Before receiving notice that the court had granted
13 4
this motion, plaintiff moved for leave to amend the summons.
Plaintiff later filed several motions for reconsideration of the
order quashing the altered summons. 135
Eventually, the
plaintiff simply obtained a new summons on the amended
complaint, and served both the amended complaint and the
summons on that complaint on defendant on June 23, 1980,

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

196 Mont. 43, 637 P.2d 517 (1981).
See 149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851 (1967), supra Section IV.A3.
See Larango, 196 Mont. at 44, 637 P.2d at 517-18.
See Matter of Estate of Swandal, 179 Mont. 429, 587 P.2d 368 (1978).
See Larango, 196 Mont. at 45, 637 P.2d at 518.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 45-46, 637 P.2d at 518-19.
See id. at 46, 637 P.2d at 519.
See id.
See id.
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more than two years after the original complaint was filed. 136
Predictably, the defendant moved for dismissal under Rule
41(e), citing the fact that this summons had not been issued
within one year of the filing of the first complaint. 137 The
district court granted this motion and dismissed the action for
138
violation of Rule 41(e).
For the first time, the Supreme Court expressed some
frustration with the use of Rule 41(e) to defeat the goal of trial
on the merits:
The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are to be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of cases,
Rule 1, and to facilitate the decision of cases on their merits. "[Ilt
is to be considered a serious matter when a party moves to have a
case disposed of on grounds other than the merits." When the
District Court quashed the May 8, 1978 summons on the ground
that it had been altered without leave of court, failed to rule upon
the motion to reconsider its quashing of the summons, and failed
to rule upon the motion to allow amendment of the summons, Rule
41(e) was brought into play.... The passage of time precluded the
effective issuance of a new summons, and the case was dismissed.
So, after four years of litigation and two reviews by this Court, the
merits of this controversy are yet to be considered.139

The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to allow amendment of the original
summons to reflect the minor changes contained in the amended
complaint. 140 The court found that amendment of the summons
would have aided in the goal of giving the defendant accurate
notice of the nature of the action against him.' 4 ' Thus, the court
remanded the action for amendment of the summons and
amendment of proof of service, specifically stating:
Issuance and service of the summons shall relate back to the
original dates of issuance and service, to insure that this case is
not dismissed for failure to comply with the time requirements of
Rule 41(e) .... 142

This case signals the first time the court stepped in to

136.

See id.

137.
138.

See id.
See id.

139.
394 P.2d
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 47, 637 P.2d at 519 (quoting Rambur v. Diehl Lumber Co., 144 Mont. 84,
745 (1964)) (citations omitted).
See id. at 47, 637 P.2d at 519.
See id. at 47-48, 637 P.2d at 520.
Id. at 48, 637 P.2d at 520.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

23

308

Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 2, Art. 2
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 60

correct a Rule 41(e) situation because of its desire to get to the
merits of the action. It is the first Rule 41(e) case in which the
delay was caused by neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiffs
attorney but by the trial court.
Larango is also the first case to directly decide whether a
summons can be amended. Stating that the power to issue a
summons lies exclusively with the clerk of court, 143 the court
pointed out that "the attorney in this matter was without
1
authority to alter the summons without leave of court."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that once leave was
145
requested, the district court should have allowed amendment.
Rule 4D(7) specifically authorizes amendment of process or proof
of service of process,'146 and the Supreme Court found an abuse
of discretion in failing to grant a motion for such amendment
when the record was devoid of any indication that the defendant
would be materially prejudiced. 147
9. Sooy v. PetrolaneSteel Gas, Inc.148
The Rule 41(e) waters were quiet for 4 years after Lovely.
Then, in 1985, the Supreme Court encountered a case squarely
presenting a conflict between the fictitious name statute, the
statute of limitations, and Rule 41(e). Sooy was the victim of a
hot water heater explosion at his home. 49
The accident
occurred on June 19, 1980150 and the statute of limitations
expired June 19, 1983. The plaintiff filed a complaint on June
17, 1983,15 1 just within the statutory period. The complaint

143. Extensively amended in 1997, MONT. R. Civ. P. 4C(1) now states that the
"plaintiffs attorney shall present summons to the clerk for issuance. If the summons is
in proper form, the clerk shall issue it and deliver it to the plaintiff or to the plaintiffs
attorney who shall thereafter deliver it for service on the defendant in the manner
prescribed by these rules." See In re Amending Rule 4C(1) of the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, 54 State Rptr. 71 (1997); Supreme Court Amends Rule on Issuance of
Summons, 22 MONT. LAWYER, Feb. 1997, at 12. While the onus is on the plaintiff or her
attorney to prepare the summons and have it served properly, only the clerk of court can
issue the summons.
144. Larango, 196 Mont. at 47,637 P.2d at 519.
145. See id.
146. MONT. R. Civ. P. 4D(7) gives the District Court the power "[a]t any time, in its
discretion . . . [to] allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended unless it
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the
party against whom the process issued."
147. See Larango, 196 Mont. at 47-48, 637 P.2d at 519-20.
148. 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014 (1985).
149. See id. at 419, 708 P.2d at 1015.
150. See id.
151. See id.
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named two defendants, Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., and Petrolane
Steel Gas Service, alleging that these defendants had failed to
add odorizers to the plaintiffs propane, thus preventing him
from knowing that he had a gas leak before he tried to light his
hot water heater. 152 Both defendants were properly served
within a few days of filing the complaint; 153 there was no Rule
41(e) problem as to them.
However, the complaint also named several fictitious "John
Doe" defendants, pursuant to Montana's fictitious name
statute. 54 The complaint alleged that these other defendants
might also have been negligent and contributed to the plaintiffs
injury. 55 After the litigation began, Sooy was able to identify
additional responsible parties: Exxon, Shell Oil, Petrolane
Supply and Perry Gas Products. 156 These four defendants were
the refiners of the propane supplied to the original two
defendants, and allegedly were responsible for adding the
157
odorant at the refinery.
The plaintiff had additional summonses issued on June 11,
1984, within the one-year Rule 41(e) period; these were served
on the newly identified defendants on June 14,1984.158 The date
of service was also well within the three-year service limit
imposed by Rule 41(e), but was almost one year after the statute
of limitations had expired. The four defendants each moved to
dismiss on the ground that they had not been named in the
action within the statute of limitations period. 159 The plaintiff
then moved for leave to amend the original complaint to change
the names of the John Does to the true names of the newly
identified defendants and to change some of the substance of the
complaint. 60 The trial court denied the leave to amend and

152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. The fictitous name statute provides:
When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of the defendant, such defendant
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; and when his
true name is discovered, the pleadings or proceedings may be amended
accordingly.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-103 (1999).

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Sooy, 218 Mont. at 419, 708 P.2d at 1015.
See id.
See id. at 419-20, 708 P.2d at 1015.
See id. at 420, 708 P.2d at 1015.
See id.
See id.
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16 1
dismissed the action against the four new defendants.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff should have been allowed to amend against the four
new defendants without leave of court, because they had not
filed any responsive pleading. 162 The court also held that the
trial court should have allowed amendment against the two
original defendants, who had filed answers, because of the
language in Rule 15(a) requiring leave to be "freely given when
1 63
justice so requires."
With regard to the four newly identified defendants, the
issue then became whether the amended complaint would relate
back to the date of the filing of the original complaint, thus
defeating the statute of limitations defense. 164
In a 1979
decision, Vincent v. Edwards,165 the court had held that an
amendment identifying previously fictitious defendants did not
relate back. 166 In Sooy, the court reversed itself and overruled
Vincent:

We now hold that when a complaint sets forth a cause of action
against a defendant designated by fictitious name and his true
name is thereafter discovered and substituted by amendment, the
fictitiously named defendant is considered a party to the action
from its commencement so that the statute of limitations stops
running as to the fictitious party on the date the original
67
complaint is filed. 1

The court found that its previous holding denied the status
of the fictitious party as being in the action from the beginning
and robbed the fictitious name statute of its efficacy, 168
reasoning that the statute was meant to help plaintiffs who are
unable to identify potential defendants without the aid of formal
161.

See id.

162. See id. at 420, 708 P.2d at 1016. MONT. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that "A party
may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served."
163. Sooy, 218 Mont. at 420, 708 P.2d at 1016.
164. See id. at 421, 708 P.2d at 1016.
165. See 184 Mont. 92, 601 P.2d 1184 (1979).
166. See Sooy, 218 Mont. at 421-22, 708 P.2d at 1016.
167. Id. at 422, 708 P.2d at 1017. The court then went on to distinguish the
situation where the original complaint does not designate any fictitious defendants:
But if parties are added by amended complaint as new parties and not as
presently identified but formerly fictitiously named defendants, the amended
complaint does not relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint
and the statute of limitations is not tolled as to such new parties.
Id.
168. See id. at 423, 708 P.2d at 1017.
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pretrial discovery. 169 In fact, the statute is most likely to be
needed just before the statute of limitations expires, when the
plaintiff is forced to conclude that he or she will be unable to
identify that defendant in time to file without using a fictitious
70

name.1

Although the Sooy holding does breathe life into the
fictitious name statute, it obviously deprives defendants of some
of the repose the statutes of limitation are supposed to provide,
as well as allowing more time for evidence to be lost or destroyed
and memories to fade. 1'7 1 The Sooy fictitious defendants could
have argued that they began "to repose" on June 19, 1983, when
they assumed the statute of limitations had expired and thus
protected them forever, and that repose was unfairly snatched
back when they were served almost a year later, on June 14,
1984. The court acknowledged this problem, and tried to take
some of the sting out of its holding by citing Rule 41(e):
There is protection for fictitiously named defendants in the
provisions of our Rule 41(e). Under that rule any defendant who
has not appeared in the action or who has not been served within
three years after the action has been commenced is entitled to a
dismissal. Moreover, under that rule, unless summons shall have
been issued within one year of the1 72commencement of the action a
defendant is entitled to dismissal.

That "protection" in effect extends the statute of limitations
against fictitiously named defendants by at least one year. The
plaintiff must identify the fictitious defendant within one year of
filing the original complaint, in order to have a summons issued
against that defendant within the Rule 41(e) deadline, even if
the complaint is filed on the last day of the statute of limitations
period. Thus, Sooy breathed one year of post-statute life into the
fictitious name statute, as the following chart shows:

169.
702 P.2d
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 422-24, 708 P.2d at 1017-18 (citing Barrington v. A.H. Robbins Co.,
563, 565 (Cal. 1985)).
See id.
See Anaconda Mining Co. v. Saile, 16 Mont. 8, 12-14, 39 P. 909, 911 (1895).
Sooy, 218 Mont. at 423-24, 708 P.2d at 1018.
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Jan. 1,
2001

Dec. 31,
2003

Jan. 1,
2004

Dec. 30,
2004

Dec. 30,
2006

Tort
occurs; P,
Smith, and
Roe are
involved,
but P does
not know
Roe's
name;
3-year
statute of
limitations
begins.

P sues Smith
and "John Doe."
P has summons
issued to Smith
but does not
serve it.
Smith inquires
and learns he
has been sued;
Roe inquires and
learns nothing.

3-year statute
of limitations
expires.
Smith knows
suit is
pending
though he has
not been
served; Roe
relaxes.

P identifies
"Doe" as Roe
and has
summons
issued.
Roe might
inquire and
learn for first
time of suit
dating from
incident on
Jan. 1, 2000.

P serves
Smith & Roe.
If Roe did not
happen to
inquire earlier,
he learns of
suit for first
time since
Jan. 1, 2000.

A fictitiously named defendant in a state cause of action
must postpone his repose for one year beyond the date of repose
for potential defendants whose identity the plaintiff knows.
Whenever fictitiously named defendants appear in any suit on
the docket, callers cannot know for sure that they will not later
be identified as one of those defendants. 173 They must suffer
continuing unease for at least one more year until Rule 41(e)
forecloses the plaintiffs opportunity to issue a summons against
74

her.1

In the typical case, where the defendant simply waits for
the sheriffs knock on his door, the effect of Montana's Rule 41(e)
is to postpone the actual day of repose by three years, the period
173. The District Clerk of Court in Missoula has computerized the county's records
from 1989 to the present. As soon as a complaint is filed, the computer record for an
action begins. Thus, if a potential defendant wished to know whether she had been
named as a defendant in a case, she could find this out before she is actually served. The
computer record also contains the record of whether a summons had been issued for a
particular defendant. All a potential defendant would have to do is call the court and
give her name to find out whether she had been sued and whether there was a summons
directed to her before she is actually served. Records prior to 1989 are not computerized
and must be searched the old fashioned way.
174. The United States Supreme Court recently commented: "There is, no doubt,
some truth to Learned Hand's comment that a lawsuit should be 'dread[ed] ... beyond
almost anything else short of sickness and death.'" Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706
n.40 (1997) (citation omitted).
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of time the rule allows a plaintiff to wait between filing a
complaint and serving a summons. Contrast this with the
situation in federal court, where even if a plaintiff waits until
the last day of the statute of limitations period to sue, defendant
175
receives service within 120 days.
10. Association of Unit Owners v. Big Sky of Montana,

Inc.

176

Big Sky is a civil procedure professor's dream and a
litigator's nightmare. Many of the larger law firms in Montana
were involved in the case, representing ten defendants including
Big Sky of Montana, Boyne USA, Chrysler Realty Corp.,
Continental
Oil,
Northwest
Airlines,
and
Burlington
177
Northern.
The plaintiffs, owners of condominiums in the Deer Lodge
Complex at the Big Sky Resort, sued to recover damages
resulting from a fire at the condominiums. 178 The original
complaint was filed January 18, 1983, but no summons was
issued at that time. 179 On February 18, 1983, the plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint and obtained a summons.'8 0
The
amended complaint identified all of the defendants, but the
summons was addressed to "Big Sky of Montana, Inc. et al.,
Defendants.' 8 1 The plaintiffs served four defendants with the
February 1983 summons within the time limits imposed by Rule
182
41(e).
In May 1984, about fifteen months after the original
summons was issued and more than a year after the complaint
was filed, the plaintiffs had a number of additional summonses
issued, marking them "duplicate summons." 183 Each duplicate
summons was addressed to the individual defendant on whom it
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The federal system does not have a rule or statute which
expressly permits or forbids the use of fictitiously named defendants. See Molnar v.
National Broad. Co., 231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956). Similarly, the federal district
court of Montana does not have a local rule either permitting or denying the use of
fictitiously named defendants. Whether a plaintiff may proceed against a John Doe
defendant lies within the discretion of the federal courts. See id.
176. 224 Mont. 142, 729 P.2d 469 (1986).
177. See id. at 142, 729 P.2d at 469. The other four defendants were served in
compliance with Rule 41(e) and were not involved in this appeal.
178. See id. at 145, 729 P.2d at 470.
179. See id. at 145, 729 P.2d at 471.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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was later served. 8 4 The plaintiffs evidently did not obtain leave
of court for the issuance and service of any "duplicate summons,"
nor do the Rules of Civil Procedure provide any authority for
such a procedure. It appears that the plaintiffs realized that
they had violated Rule 41(e) by waiting too long to have
summonses issued to the remaining defendants, and that the
plaintiffs created this new device - the duplicate summons in an effort to camouflage their error.
The Supreme Court gave short shrift to the plaintiffs'
attempt to circumvent Rule 41(e) by inventing a new type of
summons:
Our rules do not contain a provision for the issuance of a
"duplicate" summons. We disregard that terminology in the title
of the summons, and conclude that the service of such a summons
fails to meet the requirements of Rule 41(e), which requires that
the summons be issued within one year of the commencement of
the action. We are not able to relate the actual service back to the
summons properly issued on February 18, 1983, because that
summons failed to name any of the
six defendants in its caption or
18 5

anywhere else in the summons.

The Supreme Court then affirmed the district court's
dismissal of two of the six defendants who received "duplicate"
summons because the attempted service of the duplicate
summons was insufficient under Rule 41(e).18 6 The other four
defendants, whose Rule 41(e) "rights" were also violated, were
nonetheless stuck in the case because of their own errors in
7
raising the Rule 41(e) defense. 8
Rule 12(b) requires a defendant to raise certain defenses at
the outset of a case, even before the answer is filed. 88 Rules
12(g) and 12(h) require that a defendant make only one preanswer motion, consolidating all available Rule 12 defenses, in
order to prevent seriatim motions as a delay tactic. 8 9 Rule
184. For instance, the duplicate summons served on BN read: "Association of Unit
Owners of the Deer Lodge Condominium, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Burlington Northern;
et al., Defendants." See id. at 146, 729 P.2d at 471.
185. Id. at 148, 729 P.2d at 472.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 150-51, 729 P.2d at 474.
188. These defenses are: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal
jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, failure to state a
claim for which relief can be granted, and failure to join a necessary party. See MONT. R.
Civ. P. 12(b).
189. See Big Sky, 224 Mont. at 149, 729 P.2d at 473 (quoting 2A MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE

12.02 (1985)).
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12(h)(1) specifically states that the defenses of insufficient
service of process and insufficient process are waived if a Rule
12 motion is filed and they are not included in that motion. 9 0
Only two of the six defendants in Big Sky correctly followed
the dictates of Rule 12 and capitalized on the plaintiffs' error.' 9 '
These two defendants each moved to dismiss the case at the
outset and included the insufficiency of service of process
The other four hapless
defense in that initial motion. 192
defendants - Conoco, Northwest Airlines, General Electric, and
Montana Power Company - clearly did not recognize the
plaintiffs' Rule 41(e) violation at first and failed to raise either
93
insufficiency of service or process in their original responses.
Only when they received copies of the responses of BN and
Chrysler did they realize their omissions. Each defendant
undertook various ploys to disguise its omission. However, as
the plaintiffs also discovered, creativity was of no avail.
Defendant Conoco did not raise Rule 41(e) in its motion to
dismiss but argued for dismissal on that ground in its
194
subsequent brief in support of its general motion to dismiss.
Noting that a brief is neither a pleading nor a motion and thus
does not meet Rule 12(b)'s requirements, the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of Conoco. 195 Northwest
190. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 12(g) provides:
If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or
objection then available to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
he shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so
omitted ....
MONT. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) provides:
A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, or
insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if omitted from a motion in the
circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is neither made by
motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment
thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.
See also Big Sky, 224 Mont. at 148-19, 729 P.2d at 472-73.
191.
Burlington Northern and Chrysler were dismissed by the district court. Their
dismissals were affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Big Sky, 224 Mont. at 149, 729
P.2d at 473.
192. See id. at 149, 729 P.2d at 473. Because Rule 41(e) contains requirements for
the time for a summons' issuance as well as the time allowed for its service, a violation of
the time limit for issuance might constitute "insufficiency of process" while serving the
timely-issued summons too late would be "insufficiency of service of process." See supra
note 53. The two successful defendants in the Big Sky case raised the defense of
insufficiency of service. A defendant proceeding under Rule 41(e) should cover the bases
by raising both.
193. See Big Sky, 224 Mont. at 150-51, 729 P.2d at 474.
194. See id. at 150, 729 P.2d at 473.
195. See id. at 150, 729 P.2d at 473-74.
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Airlines filed a motion to dismiss and a brief without raising
Rule 41(e) in either.196 Northwest filed an "amended motion to
dismiss" without prior court permission, including a Rule 41(e)
objection, relying on Rule 15(a)'s authorization of amendment
without a court's leave if the amendment is made within 20 days
of the document's filing. 197 However, the Supreme Court held
that Rule 15(a) applies only to pleadings, that Northwest's
failure to raise Rule 41(e) in its first appearance violated Rule
198
12(b), and that the trial court erred in dismissing Northwest.
General Electric and Montana Power both filed motions to
dismiss without mentioning Rule 41(e). 99 Like Northwest, both
"amended" their motions to include Rule 41(e). 200 The Supreme
20
Court also reversed the dismissals of these defendants. '
Thus, the two defendants who correctly identified the Rule
41(e) deficiency and properly raised it as a defense in the first
appearance were dismissed from the case without ever having to
address the merits of the claims against them. Each of the four
remaining defendants probably incurred substantial legal
expenses as well as significant potential liability on the merits
solely because of their lawyers' failure to recognize the plaintiffs'
violation of Rule 41(e).
The lessons to be learned from Big Sky are clear and simple:
1. Within a year of filing the complaint, the plaintiff
must have a summons issued and addressed to each
defendant;
2. The plaintiff cannot merely issue a "duplicate
summons" after the one-year limit for issuance of
summons has run;
3. The defendant must analyze the date on the
summons and the date of service at the outset of the
case to determine whether the plaintiff complied with
Rule 41(e);
4. The defendant who wishes to have the case dismissed
for violation of Rule 41(e) must either:

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 150-151, 729 P.2d at 474.
See id. at 151, 729 P.2d at 474.
See id.
See id.
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a. file
an
answer
immediately,
including
insufficiency
of service of process
and
insufficiency of process as affirmative defenses;
or
b. file a pre-answer motion, including insufficiency
of service of process and insufficiency of process,
citing Rule 41(e).
20 2
11. Livingston v. Treasure County.
Livingston obtained the summons on the date she filed the
complaint and had that summons served on the last permissible
day of the three-year period mandated by the rule. 20 3 However,
the plaintiff failed to file the return of service of the summons
for three weeks, 204 a technical violation of part of Rule 41(e)
which, at that time, required dismissal of an action "unless
summons issued within one year shall have been served and
return made and filed with the clerk of the court within three
years after the commencement of said action."20 5
Unlike most of the defense counsel in Big Sky, counsel for
Treasure County spotted the fact that the return of service was
20 6
filed too late and moved to dismiss for violation of Rule 41(e).
The district court granted the motion and dismissed the
20 7
action.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case, holding that the failure to file the return was a mere
ministerial act, and that failure to comply with the rule's
deadline for filing return of service "neither hindered nor
delayed prosecution of the action. Nor did it affect the validity
of service." 20 8 The court looked at other rules governing proof of
service, and noted that failure to meet those time limits did not
affect validity of the service of process, and could be excused
upon a showing of good cause. 20 9 The court noted that "the facts
in the present case demonstrate that good cause has been
shown," 210 although the opinion does not refer to any

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989).
See id. at 512, 781 P.2d at 1130.
See id.
MONT. R. CIv. P. 41(e) (1990) (emphasis added).
See Livingston, 239 Mont. at 512, 781 P.2d at 1130.
See id.
Id. at 513, 781 P.2d at 1131.
See id.
See id.
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211
explanation by plaintiff as to why she filed the return late.
Instead, the court supported its holding by citing the policy of
trial on the merits,2 12 and concluded simply that "it is
appropriate here to excuse the failure to file the return."213 The
court also noted the difference between the federal rule on the
same subject and Montana's Rule 41(e), and referred this
provision of Rule 41(e) to the Commission on Rules of Procedure
214
for amendment.
Justice McDonough dissented, stating that the rule's
language was quite clear and should be enforced. 215 He observed
that the plaintiff had not offered any excuse or reason for her
delay in filing the return:

The appellant has not stated or alleged any excuse or reason...
for her failure to return in the time frame required....
The
defendant ... was always available for over one thousand days for
service of process. Our Federal Constitution was debated and
approved by the Convention, and debated and ratified by the
States in less time when communication and transportation was

211. The opinion states baldlyThree years later, on November 27, 1988, plaintiff delivered the summons and
complaint to the sheriff, who served defendant on that day. Plaintiff filed the
summons and return with the District Court on December 20, 1988.
Id. at 511, 781 P.2d at 1130.
212. See id. at 513, 781 P.2d at 1131.
213. Id. at 514, 781 P.2d at 1130.
214. In fact, the Supreme Court did formally amend the requirement relating to
filing of the return of service in 1993. That amendment changed the rule by striking the
requirement that return of service be made within the three-year period. See Montana
Supreme Court Order of Mar. 26, 1993. However, the current rule reads as follows:
No action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be further prosecuted as to
any defendant who has not appeared in the action or been served in the action
as herein provided within three years after the action has been commenced,
and no further proceedings shall be had therein, and all actions heretofore or
hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same shall
have been commenced, on its own motion or on the motion of any party
interested therein, whether named in the complaint as a party or not, unless
summons shall have been issued within 1 year, or unless summons issued

within one year shall have been served and filed with the clerk of court within
three years after the commencement of said action, or unless appearance has
been made by the defendant or defendant therein within said three years....
MONT. R. CIv. P. 41(e) (emphasis added). Thus, the amendment does not appear to meet
the criticism of the rule in Livingston, and still imposes a duty on plaintiff to meet a
deadline after service, and thus notice to the defendant, has been accomplished. If Rule
41(e) is retained, it should at least be amended to eliminate a deadline for filing proof of
service on the returned summons. The purpose of the rule is to give notice to the
defendant; filing proof of that notice is truly ministerial.
215. See Livingston, 239 Mont. at 514, 781 P.2d at 1131 (McDonough, J.,
dissenting).
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2 16
done by horse and buggy.

In Justice McDonough's view, the majority's willingness to bend
the clear language of the rule fostered delay, directly contrary to
the court's expressed desire to accomplish just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of lawsuits. 217
218
12. Courchane v. Kuntz.
Less than a year after Livingston was decided, the plaintiffs
in Courchane invoked its reasoning to argue that their Rule
41(e) dismissal was also based on a technicality and that their
case also ought to be allowed to proceed on the merits. 21 9 On
October 17, 1986, the Courchanes filed a complaint against the
sellers of their home, alleging fraud and negligent
misrepresentation as to the condition of the sewer system. 220
More than three years later, the plaintiffs amended the
complaint to join the realtor as a defendant. 22 1 The new
defendant, Flynn Realty, moved to dismiss on the ground that it
was not served with summons within three years of the
commencement of the action. 222 The district court, finding the
rule to be clear and mandatory, agreed and dismissed the

action.

223

Reasoning that the language of the original complaint
referred to the sellers' agent, and that the plaintiffs could easily
have included the realtor in the original complaint, the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's dismissal:
To allow Flynn Realty to be joined after three years had elapsed
would not have been timely, and Courchanes have not stated or
alleged any legal excuse or reason to invoke the equity of a court
224
for their failure to join Flynn Realty in the time frame required.

Though the plaintiffs argued that they did not know the
realtor was a potential defendant until they had undertaken

216. Id.
217. See id. The majority stated that the purpose of Rule 41(e) was to ensure timely
prosecution of actions; the majority then found that service of the summons and
complaint was indispensable but filing the return of service was not essential. See id. at
513, 781 P.2d at 1130-31.
218. 246 Mont. 216, 806 P.2d 12 (1990).
219. See id. at 217, 806 P.2d at 13.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Courchane v. Kuntz, 246 Mont. 216, 218, 806 P.2d 12, 14 (1990).
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discovery against the sellers, 225 the court did not address this
contention. It is not clear what excuse, if any, would have been
sufficient to convince the court to waive the Rule 41(e) violation
in this case, but the Courchanes must have been frustrated by
the result in their case, when the Livingstons offered no excuse
at all for violating another portion of Rule 41(e). On the other
hand, in Courchane, there was neither service nor return of
service; Flynn Realty had no notice at all of the claim against it
for more than three years after the lawsuit began. In the
Livingston case, the defendant was served (barely) within the
three years and thus had actual notice. 226
227
13. Sinclair v. Big Bud ManufacturingCo.
In Sinclair, a wrongful termination of employment action,
the Supreme Court dismissed several defendants under Rule
41(e). 228
The plaintiff worked at various times in various
capacities for several interrelated corporations. 229 After he was
230
fired from his last such job, he sued that company, BBMC.
The original complaint was filed on May 31, 1990.231 The
plaintiff filed an amended complaint in January, 1992, adding
as defendants several of the interrelated corporations. 232 In
February 1992, the new defendants moved to dismiss, arguing
that the plaintiff had not had summonses issued to them within
one year of the action's commencement. 233 The trial court
denied this motion because the new defendants had appeared in
the lawsuit within three years of the commencement of the
234
action.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to issue a
summons within one year of the commencement of the action
entitles a defendant to dismissal of the action. 235 The court
granted that "an action may be further prosecuted under Rule

225. See id. at 217-18, 806 P.2d at 13-14.
226. See Livingston v. Treasure County, 239 Mont. 511, 512, 781 P.2d 1129, 1130
(1989), supra Section IV.A.11.
227. 262 Mont. 363, 865 P.2d 264 (1993).
228. See id. at 364, 865 P.2d at 265.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 364, 865 P.2d at 266.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. These defendants asserted both possible defenses for this violation,
insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service or process. See id. at 365-66, 865
P.2d at 266.
234. See id. at 366, 865 P.2d at 266.
235. See id. at 367, 865 P.2d at 266-67.
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41(e)... if a defendant appears within three years of the
commencement of the action even though summons has not been
timely issued."236 Even so, the court held that the defendants'
motion to dismiss based on Rule 41(e) was not an "appearance"
within the meaning of the rule and did not constitute a basis for
237
further prosecution of the action.
Big Sky and Sinclair together teach that a defendant who
believes a plaintiff violated Rule 41(e) should, if at all possible,
delay filing any response at all during the three year period, in
order to avoid the appearance of "appearing." This course of
action, however, raises the specter of default, which could later
be set aside under Shields v. Pirkle.238 If a defendant does file
any response within the three-year period, she should confine
that response to a Rule 12 motion raising only the Rule 41(e)
violation and those other defenses, such as improper venue or
lack of personal jurisdiction, which must be raised in a
239
defendant's first motion to the court.
In Sinclair,the plaintiff argued that he had in fact complied
with Rule 41(e) when he had a summons timely issued to
BBMC, because that corporation and the other defendants were
in fact "one and the same." 240 The Supreme Court rejected this
"meritless" theory:
Rule 4C expressly requires summons [sic] to set forth the names of
the parties.
Thus, the summons naming only BBMC as a
defendant does not provide a basis for the court to allow
prosecution of the action against the non-BBMC241defendants, each
of which is a separate legal entity or individual.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs excuse that he had been
unable to discover his claims against the new defendants within
the year after he filed his original complaint, finding that the
plaintiff knew of the factual basis of those claims at the time he

236.

Id. at 367, 865 P.2d at 267.

237.

See id. Compare this with the situation of the four defendants in Big Sky, who

made other types of initial motions without mentioning Rule 41(e). Under this
reasoning, those defendants were not entitled to dismissal under the rule, not only
because they waived their Rule 12(b) defenses of insufficiency of process and of service
under Rule 12(h), but also because they appeared in the action within three years of its
commencement.
238. See Shields v. Pirkle Refrigerated Freightlines, Inc., 181 Mont. 37, 591 P.2d
1120 (1979), supra Section W.A.5.
239. See MoNT. R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h)(1).
240.
241.

Sinclair,262 Mont. at 368, 865 P.2d at 267.
Id.
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filed the first complaint. 242
14. FirstCall, Inc. v. CapitalAnswering Service, Inc. 243
In First Call, the Supreme Court agreed with the district
court that the complaint should be dismissed because the
plaintiff failed to serve the summons within three years, in
violation of Rule 41(e). 244

However, the court reversed the

district court's dismissal without prejudice, holding that such a
dismissal should be made with prejudice and accorded res
245
judicata effect.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial judge had
been correct in dismissing without prejudice because of its prior
holdings in Whitcraft v. Semenza 246 and State ex rel. Equity
Supply v. District Court.247 In First Call, the court overruled
those two cases, holding that the language of Rule 41(e) was
"clear and unambiguous." 248

It cited with approval Justice

Haswell's concurring opinion in the Equity Supply case:
The purpose of this Rule is not only to promote diligent
prosecution of claims once suit has been filed thereon, but also to
bar further prosecution of laches lawsuits. The Commission Note
to amended Rule 41(e) makes this clear... [T]his purpose is
completely defeated by interpreting... [the rule] to permit a
subsequent refiling of a laches lawsuit previously
dismissed so
24 9
long as the statute of limitations has not expired.

Thus, it is now clear that dismissals under Rule 41(e) are
dismissals with prejudice and have res judicata effect as though

the case had been tried to conclusion and judgment rendered
against the plaintiff. This means that a plaintiffs violation of
Rule 41(e) in effect constitutes her one day in court - a bad way
to waste that day.
25 °
15. Webb v. TD.

The Supreme Court decided three separate Rule 41(e) cases
in 1996. Webb, the first of these, was a medical malpractice
242. See id. at 369, 865 P.2d at 268.
243. 271 Mont. 425, 898 P.2d 96 (1995).
244. See id. at 427, 898 P.2d at 97.
245. See id. at 428, 898 P.2d at 98.
246. See 145 Mont. 94, 399 P.2d 757 (1965).
247. See 159 Mont. 34, 494 P.2d 911 (1972).
248. First Call, 271 Mont. at 427, 898 P.2d at 97.
249. Id. at 427-28, 898 P.2d at 97 (citing State ex rel. Equity Supply Co. v. District
Court, 159 Mont. 34, 41, 494 P.2d 911, 915 (1972)).
250. 275 Mont. 243, 912 P.2d 202 (1996).
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action against an orthopedist and a radiologist. The plaintiff
first filed a claim with the Medical Legal Panel, within the
251
statute of limitations period, against these two defendants.
After the Panel's decision, she filed a complaint in district court
and obtained a summons the same day. 252 However, she did not
serve the summons on the defendants then.253
Later, her
counsel decided that her chiropractor also should be a defendant
and filed a claim against the chiropractor with the Chiropractic
Legal Panel, including the orthopedist and radiologist as
necessary and proper parties to the action against the
chiropractor. 25 The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the
district court lawsuit against the orthopedist and the
255
radiologist.
When the chiropractic panel rendered its decision, the
plaintiff filed a second complaint in district court against all
three defendants. 256 The orthopedist and radiologist moved to
dismiss this second action against them claiming that the
plaintiff had violated Rule 41(e) by failing to serve the
summonses in the first action on them before she dismissed that
action, and that under the holding in First Call, the plaintiffs
257
dismissal of the first action was actually with prejudice.
The Supreme Court disagreed, limiting First Call to
situations where dismissals on Rule 41(e) violations are made by
courts, not plaintiffs. 25 8 The court also noted that a summons
had been issued within one year of the filing of the first action,
and that the second complaint and summons in fact were served
within three years of the commencement of the first action. 259
The court did not comment on whether plaintiffs would have
violated Rule 41(e) if they had waited more than three years
from the filing of the first complaint but less than three years
from the filing of the second action to serve the summons and
complaint in the second action. However, it seems clear that
this would not be a Rule 41(e) violation. The language of the
rule speaks repeatedly of "an action," and the dismissal of the

251.
252.
253.

See id. at 244, 912 P.2d at 203.
See id. at 246, 912 P.2d at 203.
See id. at 246, 912 P.2d at 204.

254.

See id.

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 249, 912 P.2d at 206.
id. at 249-50, 912 P.2d at 206.
id. at 250, 912 P.2d at 207.
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first action should mean that the second action stands on its
own, with its own separate Rule 41(e) deadlines measured from
the commencement of that second action.
260
16. Busch v. Atkinson.
The next Rule 41(e) case dealt with a failure to have a
summons issued within one year of the filing of the complaint.
Busch's personal injury complaint was filed on January 31,
1992, just within the statute of limitations period. 261 Eight
months later, in a status report to the court, plaintiffs counsel
advised the court that he had not served the summons and
complaint because he was in continuing negotiations with
defendants' insurance company. 262
In March 1993, plaintiff discovered that no summons had
ever been issued. 263 The plaintiff then attempted to have the
clerk issue a summons, but the clerk refused, on the ground that
the one-year Rule 41(e) period had expired. 26" The plaintiff then
moved for leave of court to extend the one-year period on the

basis of excusable neglect. 265 In July 1993, the district court

granted leave to file an amended complaint and have a
summons issued on the amended complaint, on the theory that a
summons might still be issued on an amended complaint. 266
However, the plaintiff failed to file the amended complaint or
have the summons issued until prodded to do so by the court in
January 1995.267 The plaintiff had the summons served and
filed return of service on the day the three-year limit in Rule
41(e) was to expire.268
The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule

260. 278 Mont. 478, 925 P.2d 874 (1996).
261. See id. at 480, 925 P.2d at 875.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 480-81, 925 P.2d at 875.
265. See id. at 481, 925 P.2d at 875. The proffered excuse was that plaintiffs
counsel's calendaring system "was completely wiped out by a computer virus in January
1993," preventing the lawyer from discovering that no summons had been issued. Id.
The attorney stated that he mistakenly believed that he had a summons issued soon
after he filed the status report in September 1992. See id. Justice Gray's concurrence,
joined by Justice Nelson, observed that "Plaintiffs counsel can hardly be praised for the
diligent pursuit of his client's case ....
If this case were to be decided purely on
excusable neglect grounds and without the overlay of the issue involving Rules 4C(1) and
41(e), the result might well be different." See id. at 486, 925 P.2d at 879.
266. See Busch, 278 Mont. at 481, 925 P.2d at 875.
267. See id. at 481, 925 P.2d at 875-76.
268. See id.
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41(e). 269 The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the
action because of the plaintiffs failure to issue a summons
within one year of the commencement of the action. 270 The
district court also held that the one-year time period ran from
the date the original action was filed, even though the plaintiff
271
was permitted to file an amended complaint.
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted its earlier rulings that:
Rule 41(e) requires dismissal of an action where summons is not
issued within one year of the commencement of the action, unless
an appearance is made by the272defendant within three years of the
commencement of the action.

The court did not rule on plaintiffs arguments that a trial
court has authority to extend the time for issuance of the
summons for good cause or excusable neglect. Instead, it
decided the case on the issue of who has the burden of issuing
the summons in a timely manner: the plaintiffs attorney or the
273
clerk of court.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Montana practice
had been for the attorney to prepare the summons and then
direct the clerk of court to issue that summons at a specified
time, but then found that this prevailing practice was "actually
at odds with what the Rules clearly and unambiguously
require."27 4 The court held that Rule 4C(1) requires the clerk of
court to "forthwith issue a summons, and.., deliver the
summons either to the sheriff... or to the person who is to serve
it."275

Under this reading of the rule, the Supreme Court found

that the plaintiffs attorney is able only to request delivery of the
summons and then take responsibility for its service and return,
276
but the attorney has no power or duty to issue the summons.
That being so, the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs
action caused by the late issuance of the summons:
Since Rule 4C(1) clearly places the initial burden and mandatory
duty of issuing and delivering a summons on the clerk of court
269. They filed a combined Rule 12(b) motion, alleging both insufficiency of process
and insufficiency of service of process under Rule 41(e). See id. at 479, 481, 925 P.2d at
875, 876.
270. See id. at 479, 925 P.2d at 875.
271. See id. at 482, 925 P.2d at 876.
272. Id. (citations omitted).
273. See id. at 483, 925 P.2d at 877.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 484, 925 P.2d at 877.
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upon the filing of the complaint, we are unwilling to affirm the
trial court sanctioning the Plaintiff with dismissal under Rule
41(e) and with the irrevocable deprivation of her day in court,
where that sanction results clearly from the failure of the clerk
an officer of the court - to perform this duty, which is clearly
required under the Rules and is solely within that official's
277
responsibility.
-

A unanimous court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs
action to proceed. 2 78 It then signalled its intention to amend
Rule 4C(1) to place the burden of insuring issuance of summons
on the plaintiff, rather than on the clerk, thus revising the
language of the rule to reflect the prevailing practice.27 9 This
amendment occurred in 1997.280 It is now clear that it is the
responsibility of the plaintiffs lawyer to insure that the
summons is actually issued within the one year period, as well
as to have it served and the return of service filed in conformity
28
with Rule 41(e). 1
28 2
17. Haugen v. Blaine Bank.
On the same day that it decided Busch, the Supreme Court
issued another much more controversial Rule 41(e) opinion, this
time affirming a dismissal under that rule. Unlike the Busch
decision, Haugen polarized the court and provides some juicy
legal reading.
The plaintiffs sued a bank and some individual defendants
on August 28, 1992, seeking damages for an alleged unlawful

277.

See id. at 484, 925 P.2d at 878.

278.

See id. at 486, 925 P.2d at 878.

279. See id. at 485, 925 P.2d at 878.
280. See In re Amending Rule 4C(1) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 St.
Rep. 71 (1997).
281. The amended MONT. R. Civ. P. 4C(1) now reads:
Upon or after filing the complaint the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff is represented
by an attorney, the plaintiff's attorney shall present a summons to the clerk for
issuance. If the summons is in proper form, the clerk shall issue it and deliver
it to the plaintiff or to the plaintiffs attorney who shall thereafter deliver it for
service upon the defendant in the manner prescribed by these rules. Issuance,
service and filing of the served summons with the clerk shall be accomplished
within the times prescribed by Rule 41(e) of these rules. Upon request, the
clerk shall issue separate or additional summons against any parties
designated in the original action, or against any additional parties who may be
brought into the action, which separate or additional summons shall also be
served and filed in the manner and within the time prescribed by these rules.
The party requesting issuance of the summons shall bear the burden of having
it properly and timely served and filed with the clerk.
282. 279 Mont. 1, 926 P.2d 1364 (1996).
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sale of personal property at a sheriffs sale. 28 3 The clerk of court
issued a summons for each defendant on July 23, 1993, within
2
the Rule 41(e) limit, but the summonses were never served. 4
As the end of the three-year service period neared, two
defendants prepared a motion to dismiss for failure to comply
with Rule 41(e). 28 5 Unfortunately for them, they apparently
mistakenly filed the motion on August 24, 1995,286 a few days
before the three-year period actually expired, thus sounding an
alarm for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs responded by making their own mistake.
They obtained amended summonses and had them served on
two defendants on August 25, 1995 and on a third defendant on
August 29, 1995.287 Pursuant to the instruction of plaintiffs'
counsel, the sheriff returned the summonses and proof of service
to the lawyer, rather than directly to the clerk of court, and did
not do that until August 31, 1995.288 The attorney mailed the
returned summonses to the clerk of court on September 2,
1995.289 The clerk received and filed them on September 5,
1995.290

As in Livingston v. Treasure County29 l seven years earlier,
the plaintiffs here accomplished service on at least two
defendants just barely within the three-year period mandated by
Rule 41(e).
However, the return of service for all these
defendants was filed after that period expired. 292 Relying on
Livingston, the plaintiffs argued that the filing of the proofs of
service was simply ministerial and not essential to the goal of
Rule 41(e).2 93 The plaintiffs in Haugen were undoubtedly
shocked to learn that the pendulum had swung to the opposite
extreme in the seven short years since Livingston:
Having carefully considered Livingston and other more recent
decisions involving Rule 41(e)... we now conclude that our

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See id. at 4, 926 P.2d at 1365.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 4, 926 P.2d at 1366.
See id.
See id. at 5, 926 P.2d at 1366.
See 239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989), supra Section IV.A.11.
See Haugen, 279 Mont. at 4, 926 P.2d at 1366.
See id. at 6, 926 P.2d at 1366.
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294
interpretation of this Rule in Livingston was incorrect.

Writing for the majority, Justice Nelson quoted Justice
McDonough's dissent in the Livingston case, 295 as well as from
the majority's language in First Call,296 and reiterated the
court's obligation simply to apply plainly stated rules:
The language of Rule 41(e)... is clear and unambiguous; all
actions shall be dismissed unless summons issued within one year
"shall have been served and filed with the clerk of court within
three years after the commencement of said action." We therefore
hold that filing proof of service with the clerk of court is not
"simply a ministerial act" as we stated in Livingston and we
297
overrule Livingston on that basis.

The Haugen majority expressed concern with the rights of
defendants, whereas the Livingston court based its decision on
the harshness of the dismissal to the plaintiff and the goal of
trial on the merits:
Furthermore, we reasoned in Livingston that dismissing an action

because the plaintiff failed to file proof of service... was too harsh
a result and prejudicial to the plaintiff. On the contrary,
permitting a plaintiff to disregard the mandates of Rule 41(e) is
prejudicial to the defendant and defeats the purpose of the Rule
which298is to promote diligent prosecution of claims once suit is
filed.
The court found that plaintiffs were "less than diligent" in
proceeding with their claim, and failed to take advantage of
several different options which would have guaranteed
compliance with Rule 41(e): having the sheriff file the proofs of
service directly with the clerk of court; directing the sheriff to
serve and provide plaintiffs' counsel with the returns by a
specific date; picking up the proofs of service rather than having
the sheriff mail them; and finally, simply having the service
299
occur earlier to allow time to meet Rule 41(e).
The majority considered and rejected a plea that its reversal
of Livingston and its new insistence on having the return of

294. Id.
295. See Livingston, 239 Mont. at 514, 781 P.2d at 1131 (McDonough, J.,
dissenting), supra Section 1V.A.11.
296. See First Call, Inc. v. Capital Answering Serv., Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 428, 898
P.2d 96, 97 (1995), supra Section IV.A.14.
297. Haugen, 279 Mont. at 6, 926 P.2d at 1367.
298. Id.
299. See id. at 7, 926 P.2d at 1367.
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service filed within three years of the date of the filing of the
complaint should be applied prospectively and not to the Haugen
parties.3 00 Thus, it affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action against all three defendants, including the two who
3 01
clearly were served within the three year period.
Justice Nelson also filed a special concurrence, joined by
Justice Gray. In that opinion, he put the blame for the loss of
the plaintiffs' cause of action squarely on their own shoulders:
The rules are there for both parties to read and to follow. If
lawyers choose to conduct their practices in the eleventh hour,
neither they nor their clients should be particularly surprised
when, whether through dalliance, neglect or lack of attention to
the time limits clearly set forth in the rules, time eventually runs
out....
Finally, contrary to the dissent, it is not the majority opinion
that has denied these litigants their day in court but, rather, it is
the litigants' own failure to pursue their lawsuit with diligence
and within the time limits unambiguously set forth in Rule 41(e).
If those time limits or the requirements of the rule serve as
nothing more than to impose meaningless barriers to litigation, as
the dissent seems to believe, then the rule should be changed.
Unless and until it is, however... [defendants] have as much
right to rely on this rule in their effort to avoid the expense and
time of defending.., as... [plaintiffs] had in bringing
suit and
30 2
prosecuting this cause of action in the first place.

Justices Leaphart, Trieweiler, and Hunt each filed
dissenting opinions.
Justice Leaphart believed both that
Livingston should not be overruled and that if it was, the new
rule should not apply to the Haugens. 30 3 He observed that the
defendants had in fact been served and had formal notice of the
claim against them within the three year period, and that filing
the return of service had nothing to do with the subsequent
procedural steps available to the defendants. 3°4 That being so,
Justice Leaphart could find no prejudice to defendants from the
several days' delay in filing the return of service, especially
when weighed against plaintiffs' prejudice in losing their right
30 5
to trial on the merits.
Both Justices Leaphart and Trieweiler stressed the
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See id. at 7-9, 926 P.2d at 1367-69.
See id. at 9, 926 P.2d at 1369.
Id. at 12-13, 926 P.2d at 1370-71.
See id. at 13, 926 P.2d at 1371 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
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importance of fairness to the litigants. They were primarily
concerned with the plaintiffs, who had relied on the court's
earlier and opposite interpretation of Rule 41(e) in the
Livingston case. Justice Trieweiler reasoned that the bar had
every bit as much right to rely on the Supreme Court's decision
in Livingston as it did to rely on the language of the rule, and
that now penalizing plaintiffs for that reliance was simply
unfair:
No amount of pontification by the majority about the retroactive
application of judicial decisions can disguise its callous disregard
for the rights of the litigants in this case. Cutting through the
legal mumbo-jumbo in the majority opinion, the practical effect of
its decision is simply indefensible based on any notions
of fairness,
30 6
common sense, or respect for the legal profession.
Justice Leaphart maintained that the plaintiffs' lawyer had
done exactly what the Livingston court had told him he could do:
serve within the three year limit but wait a short time before
filing proof of that service.3 07 Furthermore, Justice Trieweiler
reasoned that the filing, or not filing, of the proof of service did
absolutely nothing to further the lawsuit: "In fact, if the affidavit
is never filed it would make absolutely no difference to
308
anyone."
Justice Hunt echoed this sentiment, stating that "the error
complained of here is a mere technicality if ever there was
one" 309 and that the court's often-stated policy in favor of trial on
the merits should override this technical error in order to
achieve the goal of substantial justice for all litigants. 310 He also
observed that the plaintiffs had in fact met all other deadlines in
this case, even if some of those actions were done later rather

306. Id. at 16, 926 P.2d at 1373 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting). Justice Nelson
characterized Justice Trieweiler's prose as:
[Slound-bite legal writing... guaranteed to provide easy copy for the press,
editorial writers and talk-show hosts - especially those who could care less
about reading, much less fairly and intelligently reporting, the opinion when
there is a dissent full of one-liners to quote. However, it is precisely this sort of
rule-from-the-gut and shoot-from-the-hip approach that produces resultoriented decisions like Livingston.
See id. at 12, 926 P.2d at 1370.
307. See id. at 16, 926 P.2d at 1373.
308. Id. at 17, 926 P.2d at 1373. This is true in all circumstances except one: the
return of service must be filed before a court will enter a default judgment.
309. Id. at 19, 926 P.2d at 1374.
310. See id. at 18, 926 P.2d at 1374.
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than earlier in the allowable periods. 311
Despite these passionate dissents, four members of the
court voted to, and did, dismiss the plaintiffs' action for failure
to file the proof of service within the three years required by
Rule 41(e), even though the plaintiffs had gotten the summonses
issued and served on time. Once again, the plaintiffs' violation
of Rule 41(e) resulted in a total loss of their cause of action.
3 12
18. Yarborough v. Glacier County.
The next Rule 41(e) case provided an opportunity for the
court to reunite in a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Trieweiler. The case involved an employment contract
dispute. 313 The Rule 41(e) question arose but was not discussed
in Haugen: what is the effect of obtaining a summons within the
first year, but later serving an identical duplicate summons
3 14
which was issued after the first year?
Yarborough filed her complaint and had a summons issued
the same day, July 8, 1993. 315 In February of 1994, plaintiffs
counsel sent the complaint and summons to the Glacier County
Attorney and asked him to acknowledge service. 316 He refused
to do so, requiring personal service on the county. 317 At some
point after February 15, 1994, but before it could be served, the
original summons was lost.318 In June of 1995, almost two years
after the action was commenced, plaintiffs counsel asked the
319
clerk of court to reissue a photocopy of the original summons.
The only change from the original summons was in its title:
"Duplicate Summons."320 This duplicate summons was served
with the complaint on October 3, 1995, well within the threeyear limit imposed by Rule 41(e). 32 1 The defendant moved to
dismiss under Rule 41(e), arguing that the summons with which
it was served had not in fact been issued within one year of the
filing of the complaint. 322 The district court originally denied the

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See
285
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 20, 926 P.2d at 1375.
Mont. 494, 948 P.2d 1181 (1997).
id. at 495, 948 P.2d at 1181.
id.
id.
id. at 495, 948 P.2d at 1182.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 496, 948 P.2d at 1182.
id.
id.
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motion to dismiss. 323
Later, after the Supreme Court's decisions in Busch and
Haugen, the defendant moved for reconsideration on the ground
that these new decisions indicated that Rule 41(e) was to be
applied literally. 324 Glacier County also argued that the Rules of
Civil Procedure do not provide for a "duplicate summons" in any
event, as the Supreme Court had observed in Big Sky. 325 The
district court reversed itself and dismissed the plaintiffs

action. 326

On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff had
complied with Rule 41(e) despite the duplicate summons, and
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court:
In substance, the summons served on Glacier County was
identical to the original summons which had originally been
issued. Glacier County received exactly the same notice in exactly
the same form it would have received had the original summons
not been lost... [N]o prejudice can be demonstrated by Glacier
County from the mere fact that it 327
received a copy of the original
summons, rather than the original.
The court distinguished this case from
duplicate summonses were also obtained by
the one year period, on the basis that the
summonses were in fact quite different
summonses. 328 In Big Sky, the court stated:

Big Sky, in which
the plaintiffs after
Big Sky duplicate
from the original

We are not able to relate the actual service back to the summons
properly issued on February 18, 1983, because that summons
failed to name any of the six defendants in its caption or anywhere
else in the summons. As a result, that summons would have been
inadequate to give notice to these six defendants329because of the
absence of the defendants' names in the summons.
In Yarborough, the two summonses were identical, and the
defendant received exactly the same notice from the duplicate as
it would have received from the original. 330 Justice Trieweiler

323.

See id.

324. See id.
325. See id. at 497, 948 P.2d at 1183. See also Association of Unit Owners v. Big
Sky of Montana, Inc., 224 Mont. 142, 148, 729 P.2d 469, 472 (1986) ("Our rules do not
contain a provision for the issuance of a 'duplicate' summons."), supra Section IV.A. 10.
326. See Yarborough, 285 Mont. at 496, 948 P.2d at 1182.
327. Id. at 499, 948 P.2d at 1183.
328. See id. at 497-98, 948 P.2d at 1183.
329.
330.

Big Sky, 224 Mont. at 148, 729 P.2d at 472.
See Yarborough, 285 Mont. at 499, 948 P.2d at 1183-84.
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also distinguished this case from Haugen, finding that this
plaintiff had been diligent whereas the court had found the
331
Haugen plaintiffs to lack diligence.
Therefore, Yarborough stands for the proposition that a
plaintiff may successfully serve within three years a summons
which was not itself issued within one year from the filing of the
complaint, so long as that summons is identical to a summons
issued within the one year period but later lost.332 However, like
Livingston v. Treasure County, this case is simply a judicial
interpretation of fairly clear language in the rule, and like
Livingston, is subject to retroactive overruling by a later court.
To avoid the gamble which plaintiffs lost in the Haugen case, a
prudent practitioner should calendar both issuance and location
of the original summons before the end of the first year of the
litigation, to allow time to have a duplicate issued before that
year expires if the first summons has been lost.
333
19. Rocky Mountain Enterprises,Inc. v. Pierce Flooring.
In Rocky Mountain, the plaintiffs filed their original
complaint on October 21, 1988, and obtained a summons naming
Pierce Flooring as a defendant on that same day. 334
A
subsequent summons was issued more than a year later but was
never served. 335 A third summons was issued on February 28,
1990, and served on Pierce sometime in March 1990.336 This
third summons was served within the three-year limit for
service, but had not been issued within the one-year limit for
issuance. 337 Pierce moved to dismiss the action against it based
on Rule 41(e), contending that they were served with a summons
which had not been issued on time. 338 After the defense filed
this motion, the plaintiffs attempted to cure the alleged
deficiency by re-serving Pierce with the summons which had
been issued on October 21, 1988. 339 That re-service occurred
April 16, 1990, less than three years after the commencement of

331. See id. at 498, 948 P.2d at 1183.
332. This is apparently what the plaintiffs did in Haugen. See Haugen v. Blaine
Bank, 279 Mont. 1, 4, 926 P.2d 1364, 1365 (1996), supra Section ]V.A.17. However, the
defendants in Haugen did not raise failure to issue the summons as a defense.
333. 286 Mont. 282, 951 P.2d 1326 (1997).
334. See id. at 304, 951 P.2d at 1340.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 305, 951 P.2d at 1340.
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the action.340 The district court held that the plaintiffs had in
341
fact cured the earlier Rule 41(e) problem.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the
original summons was issued within the one year and served
within the three-year period specified in the rule. 342 Recognizing

that First Call held that failure to serve within the three-year
limit required dismissal with prejudice 343 and that Sooy required
the same result where the summons was not issued within the
one-year period, 3 " the court stated: "We determine that the
issuing of subsequent summonses did not serve to nullify the
345
original summons."
The court noted again that "[t]he purpose of Rule 41(e)... is
to ensure that actions are timely prosecuted."346 Although it did
not discuss the rationale behind its conclusion that the issuance
and service scenario in Rocky Mountain met Rule 41(e)'s
requirements, it appears that the court found that the invalid
first service did not interfere with the timely prosecution of the
case, because the plaintiffs did in fact ultimately accomplish
service of a timely issued summons and thus did not delay the
case beyond the limits set by Rule 41(e).
347
20. Eddleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

Like Livingston,348 Eddleman involved a failure to file the
return of service within the three-year period. 349 The summons
was issued and served on time. 350 The defendant moved to
dismiss for the Rule 41(e) violation, and the district court denied
the motion, based on the Livingston case. 351 After Haugen
reversed Livingston, Aetna moved for reconsideration of its Rule
41(e) motion. 35 2 The court did reconsider and granted the Rule

340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id. at 305, 951 P.2d at 1341.
343. See First Call, Inc. v. Capital Answering Serv., Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 428, 898
P.2d 96, 98 (1995), supra Section IV.A.14.
344. See Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 218 Mont. 418, 423-24, 708 P.2d 1014,
1018 (1985), supra Section IV.A.9.
345. Rocky Mountain, 286 Mont. at 305, 951 P.2d at 1341.
346. Id. at 304, 951 P.2d at 1340.
347. 1998 MT 52, 955 P.2d 646 (1998).
348. See 239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989), supra Section IV.A.11.
349. See Eddleman, 1998 MT 52 at
2-3, 955 P.2d at 646.
350. See id. at 2.
351. See id. at 4, 955 P.2d at 647.
352. See id.
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41(e) motion, dismissing the plaintiffs case with prejudice. 353
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, finding that
Haugen controlled. 354
The court rejected the plaintiffs
arguments on appeal that the dismissal constituted a due
process violation and that Haugen should be applied
prospectively only, finding that neither argument had been
raised at the trial court level. 355 Thus, another plaintiff lost
another chance for trial on the merits solely because of a
procedural error in the relatively simple process of filing the
return of service of process.
356
21. Hadford v. CreditBureau of Havre, Inc.
Hadford revisited the issue of naming fictitious defendants
raised by the Sooy case. 357 Hadford won a default judgment
against her employer, Big Sky Billing Service, in a wrongful
discharge suit.358
Because Big Sky Billing had no assets,
Hadford attempted to collect the judgment by filing a complaint
in 1995 against the Credit Bureau of Havre, owned by the same
shareholders as Big Sky Billing Service, and against John Does
I-IV. 359 Stating that the John Does were the actual participants,
she alleged that Big Sky had been dissolved to avoid paying her
360
claim and that Big Sky was the alter ego of the Credit Bureau.
A summons was issued and served on the Credit Bureau but not
361
on the John Does.
The Credit Bureau moved for summary judgment, claiming
that it had insufficient notice of the wrongful discharge action to
be held personally liable and that it was not the alter ego of Big
Sky.362 At the same time, more than a year after filing the
complaint, plaintiff moved to further amend her complaint and
substitute the president of Big Sky, Teddy Reber, as John Doe
1.363 The court denied leave to amend and granted summary

353. See Eddleman, 1998 MT 52 at 1 4, 6, 955 P.2d at 647.
354. See id. at 1 10, 955 P.2d at 648. As in Haugen, Justices Trieweiler, Hunt, and
Leaphart dissented. See Eddleman, 1998 MT 52 at 1$ 14-16, 955 P.2d at 648.
355. See id. at It 11-12, 955 P.2d at 647.
356. 1998 MT 179, 962 P.2d 1198 (1998).
357. See Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014 (1985); see
also supra Section IV.A.9.
358. See Hadford, 1998 MT 179 at 6, 962 P.2d at 1200.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 10, 962 P.2d at 1200.
363. See id.
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judgment for defendant. 364
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that
plaintiffs failure to obtain a summons for the John Doe
defendants within one year of filing the complaint violated Rule
41(e), requiring dismissal of those defendants with prejudice and
rendering amendment useless. 365
The court also rejected
Hadford's argument that the Rule 41(e) argument was improper
because it was raised by the Credit Bureau, rather than by the
directly affected John Doe defendant:
Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P., specifically authorizes any interested party
to move for dismissal ... and it is clear that the Credit Bureau...
had a legitimate interest in opposing the motion in order to bring
366
the litigation to an end.
367

22. MacPheat v. Schauf.

Just within the past nine months, the Montana Supreme
Court has decided three more Rule 41(e) cases. In MacPheat, a
pro se plaintiff filed a complaint alleging slander. 368 The
complaint was filed April 8, 1996, and the summons was issued
that same month. 369 When the sheriff returned the summons
unserved, the plaintiff obtained a second summons which the
sheriff was also unable to serve. 370 The plaintiff then tried to
serve by publication, but the court quashed that service on the
defendant's motion.371 The court went on to dismiss the entire
case, concluding that the plaintiff had not been able and never
would be able to comply with Rule 41(e) because the summons
issued was not served within one year of the filing of the
complaint. 372
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
[Wihen a party has caused a summons to issue within one year of
the commencement of an action, he has complied with Rule 41(e).
The fact that he or she is not successful in serving the summons
within one year of the commencement of the action is of no
consequence. A party may cause additional summons to issue

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See id. at 1 11, 962 P.2d at 1200.
See id. at 38, 962 P.2d at 1204.
Id. at 41, 962 P.2d at 1205.
1998 MT 250, 969 P.2d 265 (1998).
See id. at 7, 969 P.2d at 266.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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pursuant to Rule 4C(1), M.R.Civ.P., and have three years from the
373
commencement of the action to obtain service.

The court found that at the time of dismissal, the plaintiff
had complied with Rule 41(e) by obtaining not one but two
summonses from the clerk of court, 374 and that because the
three-year period had not yet expired, the plaintiff could not
have violated the remaining provisions of Rule 41(e). 375 Relying
on Schmitz v. Vasquez, 376 the court noted that the two
summonses which were returned unserved had become functus
officio not with regard to issuance but with regard to further
service. 377 The court held that the trial court was correct in
refusing to allow the plaintiff to amend these two summonses,
but that MacPheat should "have requested an additional

summons pursuant to Rule

4C(1)."378

Without expressly

commenting, the court apparently believed that MacPheat could
still comply with Rule 41(e), and reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the action.
37 9
23. Schmitz v. Vasquez.
Decided December 23, 1998, Schmitz involved another form
of substituted summons. There, the pro se plaintiff sued Dr.
Vasquez and Dr. Sanz for medical malpractice. 3 0 The plaintiff
had made a claim against Vasquez before the Medical Legal
Panel but had not done so with regard to Sanz. 38 1 In the district
court, plaintiff obtained a summons for each defendant on the
day she filed her complaint, April 5, 1994.382 She apparently did
not serve either defendant then. When she later obtained
counsel, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 1,
1997, dropping the allegations against Sanz and leaving those
against Vasquez intact. 383 On the same day, plaintiff returned
373. Id. at 19, 969 P.2d at 268.
374. See id. at 17, 969 P.2d at 268.
375. See id.
376. 1998 MT 314, 970 P.2d 1039 (1998); see also infra Section LV.A.23. MacPheat
was originally decided on October 20, 1998, and amended on denial of rehearing on
December 30, 1998; hence its reference to the following case.
377. See MacPheat, 1998 MT 250 at
17, 969 P.2d at 268. Functus officio means
"having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and
therefore of no further force or authority." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 673 (6th ed. 1990).
378. MacPheat, 1998 MT 250 at 18, 968 P.2d at 268.
379. 1998 MT 314, 970 P.2d 1039 (1998).
380. See id. at 1 4, 970 P.2d at 1040.
381. See id. at 6, 970 P.2d at 1040.
382. See id. at 5, 970 P.2d at 1040.
383. See id. at 7, 970 P.2d at 1040.
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the original summons to the court and obtained an "amended
summons" for service on Vasquez. 384 This amended summons
was identical to the first summons except that Sanz' name was
removed and the summons bore the title "Amended
Summons." 38 5 The amended summons was served on Vasquez
on April 1, 1997, and proof of service was filed April 2, 1997,
38 6
both just within the three-year period set by Rule 41(e).

Vasquez properly objected to the service on him, claiming
that plaintiff violated Rule 41(e) because, although service was
within three years, the summons which was served had not been
issued within one year. 387 He also objected to the fact that the

plaintiff had not sought or obtained leave of court to amend the
summons under Rule 4D(7). 388
389

The trial court dismissed the

plaintiffs complaint.
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the complaint,
even though it found a technical violation of Rule 4D(7) in the
failure to obtain leave to amend the summons. 390 It held that
the original and "amended" summonses were substantively
identical, and that Vasquez received as much notice from the
amended summons as he would have from the original:
Rather than being prejudiced by the amended summons, the
amendment actually assisted Vasquez in ascertaining the true
nature of the action against him. Schmitz could not proceed
against Sanz because she did not make a claim against him before
the Medical Legal Panel and, therefore, the District Court had no
jurisdiction over him. The amended summons more accurately
reflected this fact. In Larango, we concluded that where the
amendment would have aided a party, it was an abuse
of
39 1
discretion for the district court not to allow the amendment.

The court distinguished the facts in Schmitz from those in
Big Sky on the basis that the Schmitz summonses both gave
adequate notice to the defendants, whereas the timely issued
"duplicate" summonses in Big Sky were substantially changed
and did not give adequate notice.3 92 Justice Trieweiler, writing

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

See id. at 8, 970 P.2d at 1040.
See id.
See id. at 9, 970 P.2d at 1040.
See id. at
10, 15, 970 P.2d at 1040, 1041.
See id. at $ 15, 970 P.2d at 1041.
See id. at 1 10, 970 P.2d at 1040.
See id.at 19, 970 P.2d at 1041.
Id. at 21, 970 P.2d at 1041-42.
See id. at 25, 970 P.2d at 1042.
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for the five-justice majority, stressed the policy of trial on the
merits and said, "[a]s in Yarborough, we decline to elevate form
393
over substance."
Justice Nelson wrote a dissent in which Justice Gray
concurred. He believed that Haugen controlled, and that the
plain language of Rule 41(e) required that the summons which
was served be the one issued within one year. 394 He observed
that the plaintiff could easily have served the original summons
on Vasquez 395 and further that the "one free amendment"
provision of Rule 15 did not apply because a summons is not a
pleading.396 Justice Nelson also termed the majority's view that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the technical
397
violation of Rule 41(e) - "flat wrong":
Dr. Vasquez will now be forced to defend the merits of a medical
malpractice suit from which, under the law, he is entitled to be
dismissed. His rights to rely on the courts to evenhandedly apply
the rules of civil procedure have been completely trashed. I am
hard-pressed to come up398
with a more clear example of prejudice or
result-oriented "justice."

Lastly, Justice Nelson uttered the same plea that I made in
a draft of this article last fall, a plea I reiterate here. No matter
which side of the "rule vs. merits" divide a lawyer or judge might
favor, the history of Montana cases involving Rule 41(e)
supports this plea:
Finally, it is worth noting that, for a procedural rule, Rule 41(e)
generates what, in my view, is an inordinate amount of litigation,
appeals and, sometimes, bitterly divided decisions from this Court.
I, for one, believe that it is an appropriate time for this Court's
Advisory Commission on the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure to
take a critical look at this rule and to make appropriate
recommendations to this Court. I strongly urge it to do so at the
earliest opportunity. 399

24. Quamme v. Jodsaas.40 0
The most recent Rule 41(e) case was decided only a week

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id. at 27, 970 P.2d at 1042.
See id. at 1 28, 970 P.2d at 1042-43.
See id. at 30, 970 P.2d at 1043.
See id. at 29, 970 P.2d at 1043.
Id. at 32, 970 P.2d at 1043.
Id.
Id. at 33, 970 P.2d at 1043-44.
1998 MT 341, 970 P.2d 1049 (1998).
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after Schmitz and, interestingly, involved the same set of
lawyers who litigated a Rule 41(e) issue in a different case to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier in the same year. 40 1 The
plaintiff in Quamme filed her personal injury complaint on
40 2
January 8, 1996, and obtained a summons that same day.
However, that summons was never served. 40 3 On July 10, 1997,
Quamme hired a new attorney, who, on July 15, returned the
original summons to the clerk and obtained a second
summons.4 04 This second summons was identical to the first
except that it showed the change of counsel.4 0 5 On July 22,
1997, well within the three-year service period, the plaintiffs
counsel mailed the second summons to the defendant and asked
40 6
her to acknowledge service of process.
On defendant's motion, the trial judge dismissed the
complaint for violation of Rule 41(e), relying on Haugen v.
Blaine Bank of Montana.40 7 Eight days later, the Supreme
Court decided Yarborough.40 8
The plaintiff moved for
reconsideration, but the trial court did not grant the motion. 40 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in the person of Justice Hunt,
agreed that Yarborough and Schmitz warranted reversal of the
plaintiffs dismissal.4 10 The court found that the two summonses
were "substantively identical"4 11 and that the sole change, the
name of the attorney to whom the answer should be sent,
provided more and better information to the defendant than
would service of the original summons.4 12 Again, the majority
stressed the need to elevate substance over form:
Barring Quamme from the courthouse solely because she failed to
serve the original summons, which identified an attorney who no
longer represents her, does nothing to advance the goals and

401. See Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., No. 97-35418, 162 F.3d 1167, 1998 WL
746051 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998) (unpublished table decision); see also infra Section IV.B.
402. See Quamme, 1998 MT 341 at 5, 970 P.2d at 1050.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 6, 970 P.2d at 1050.
405.

See id.

406. See id.
407. See id. at 7, 970 P.2d at 1050. See also Haugen v. Blaine Bank, 279 Mont. 1,
926 P.2d 1364 (1996), supra Section IV.A.17.
408. See Quamnme, 1998 MT 341 at 7, 970 P.2d at 1050. See also Yarborough v.
Glacier County, 285 Mont. 494, 948 P.2d 1181 (1997), supra Section IV.A.18.
409. See Quamme, 1998 MT 341 at 7, 970 P.2d at 1050.
410. See id. at 16, 970 P.2d at 1051.
411. Id. at 17, 970 P.2d at 1052.
412. See id. at 20, 970 P.2d at 1052.
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policies of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when common sense
dictated that she simply serve another substantively identical
summons that correctly informed Jodsaas of her current attorney
as required by Rule 4C(2), M.R.Civ.P. Jodsaas is unable to show
any prejudice, because the second summons adequately notified
her that she was a defendant in a civil action and that she had
4 13
twenty days in which to make an appearance.

Again, Justice Nelson registered a separate opinion,
although this time in the form of a special concurrence. He
agreed with the result, finding that the facts in this case were
similar to those in Yarborough, but reiterated his disagreement
with the result in Schmitz. 414 He also reiterated his plea for a
reconsideration of the rule in question:
As I did in Schmitz, once again I strongly urge this Court's
Advisory Commission on the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure to
take a critical look at Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. and to make
appropriate recommendations to this Court. This procedural Rule
is implicated in far too many appeals. It is obvious that the
practicing bar and trial courts have difficulty following and
applying this Rule. Worse, our decisions are rapidly becoming
simply a compilation of exceptions demonstrating that the rule is,
alternately, a trap for the unwary or a haven for the incompetent.
4 15
Either way, Rule 41(e) needs to be changed.

For over three years, the Montana bench and bar have
struggled with the application and interpretation of a single rule
of civil procedure, resulting in 24 separate opinions, many of
which are contradictory and all of which involved time, expense,
and attention that would be better devoted to the merits of each
case. Justice Nelson's summary and conclusion are correct: Rule
41(e) has proven to be a trap and should be changed.
B. The Ninth CircuitConsiders Mont. R. Civ. P. 41(e)
The federal courts, in the exercise of diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, also have had to deal with Montana's Rule 41(e)
even though no federal corollary exists. Bryan v. Fireman's
Fund began as a state court action stemming from a fire loss on
December 27, 1983.416 The plaintiffs filed the complaint on

413.
414.

Id. at 28, 970 P.2d at 1053.
See id. at 31, 970 P.2d at 1054 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).

415.
416.

Id. at 32, 970 P.2d at 1054 (citations omitted).
See Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., No. 72074 (4th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed

Dec. 27, 1989).
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4 17
December 27, 1989, and had a summons issued the same day.
41
8
That summons was never served.
A substitute summons was
issued on December 22, 1992, and served on December 23, 1992,
within the three-year period, but the return of service was not
419
filed until December 29, 1992.
The defendants removed the case to federal court on
January 21, 1993,420 and then asked the federal court to dismiss
the claim because of the plaintiffs' violation of Montana Rule
41(e). 42 1 The district court denied this motion, concluding that
state law governed the sufficiency of service when service is
made prior to removal to federal court, but finding that under
Livingston, the failure to timely file the return of service did not
warrant dismissal. 422 The court's order was dated March 14,

1994.423

When the Montana

Supreme

Court overruled

Livingston in Haugen, on October 24, 1996, the defendants
moved for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss by the federal
court. 424 Judge Lovell concluded that Haugen overrode his
425
earlier decision, and dismissed the Bryans' action.
The Bryans appealed to the Ninth Circuit. They argued
that, because defendants removed to federal court, neither
Montana Rule 41(e) nor Haugen applied; that federal procedure
controlled; and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had no
counterpart to Rule 41(e). 426
Ironically, if defendants had
foreseen Haugen, they could have stayed in state court, bided
their time, and clearly would have won dismissal after Haugen,

417. See Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., No. CV-93-12-CCL (D. Mont. Mar. 14,
1994) (order denying defendants' motion to dismiss), at 2.
418. See id.
419. See id. This presents, of course, the same problem as Livingston v. Treasure
County, 239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989), supra Section IV.A.11, and Haugen v.
Blaine Bank, 279 Mont. 1, 926 P.2d 1364 (1996), supra Section I.A.17.
420. See Bryan, No. CV-93-12-CCL (D. Mont. Mar. 14, 1994) (order denying
defendants' motion to dismiss), at 2.
421. The defendants raised the defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency
of service. See id.
422. See Bryan, No. CV-93-12-CCL (D. Mont. Mar. 14, 1994) (order denying
defendants' motion to dismiss).
423. See id. at 8.
424. This is the same route successfully followed by the defense in the state court
case ofEddleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1998 MT 52, 955 P.2d 646 (1998), supra Section
IV.A.20.
425. See Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., No. CV-93-12-CCL (D. Mont. March 11,
1997) (order granting defendants' motion to dismiss).
426. See Brief for Defendants, Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. (9th Cir. 1998)
(No. 97-35418).
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like the defendant in Eddleman.427 The defendants, of course,
not being omniscient and having fled the state system, were now
stuck arguing that the state procedural rules should apply
428
despite their removal to the federal system.
Thus, the murkiness of Montana's Rule 41(e) and its
inconsistent interpretation by the Montana Supreme Court
merged with the Erie doctrine, 429 itself the result of an aboutface4 30 in the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the
Rules of Decision Act. 431 The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument

on this case in early September 1998 in Billings and
subsequently ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that they
were entitled to proceed in federal court in spite of their failure
to comply with Montana Rule 41(e) while their case was in state
court:
Once a case has been removed to federal court, federal rather than
state procedural law governs future proceedings. "The federal
court takes the case as it finds it on removal and treats everything
that occurred in the state court as if it had taken place in federal
court." Accordingly, Mont. R. Civ. P. 41(e) does not apply to this
action, and the district court erred in relying upon it in dismissing
432
the case.

C. Lessons from the Case Law
There are two different conclusions to draw from Rule 41(e)
and the cases which interpret and apply it. Earlier, I
427. See Eddleman, 1998 MT 52, J1 10-13, 955 P.2d 646, 647-48 (1998), supra
Section IV.A.20.
428. See Bryan, No. 97-35418, 1998 WL 746051, at **1 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998).
429. See generally Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
430. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which for many years
had interpreted the Rules of Decision Act to mean that federal courts should apply
federal common law in diversity cases where a state had only case law on the issue,
though state statutory law would pre-empt federal case law. Erie held, for the first time,
that state substantive law controls in diversity actions, whether that state law is found
in statutory or common law. This apparently clear doctrine has given rise to a body of
federal diversity cases struggling to delineate substantive, state law issues from
procedural, federal issues. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)
(statutes of limitation are substantive and state law controls); Cities Service Oil Co. v.
Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) (burden of proof is substantive and state law controls);
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (method of service of process is procedural and
FED. R. Civ. P. 4D(1) controls).
431. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
432. Bryan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., No. 97-35418, 162 F.3d 1167, 1998 WL
746051, at **1 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (quoting Butner v.
Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1963)).
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synthesized the Rule and the cases into a set of clear guidelines
for the practitioner to follow as long as Rule 41(e) persists. 433
Secondly, and more importantly, Rule 41(e) case law
demonstrates that the rule, in its current form, is unmanageable
and must be either substantially simplified or eliminated
altogether.
Attorneys seem to have inordinate trouble complying with
the current Rule 41(e). The sheer number of cases arising from
Rule 41(e) indicates that this rule represents a significant
challenge to the Montana bar, and thus, to the Montana
Supreme Court. Issuance and service of process should be a
relatively insignificant aspect of pretrial procedure, not a deadly
trap waiting to snare the unwary. The goal of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, overall, is to facilitate trial on the merits. Rule 41(e),
as currently written and applied, is a threat to that goal.
In all of the cases where Rule 41(e) has been invoked
successfully to dismiss cases without providing trial on the
merits to the plaintiffs,4 34 it appears that plaintiffs were
represented by counsel who, for one reason or another, did not
comply with the rule. The Montana Supreme Court has only
sporadically shown sympathy for the clients whose cases were
lost through their lawyers' inability to correctly apply Rule
41(e).
For instance, in Rierson v. State,435 the court echoed its
language from Equity Supply, 36 another Rule 41(e) case where
the plaintiffs claim was dismissed:
An attorney's mistake is unfortunate, particularly here where
Rierson's claim was dismissed with prejudice. However, there are
two sides to all litigation, and the State and the Board of

433. See supra Part III.
434. Whitcraft, Belwin, Equity Supply, Shields, Larango, Livingston, Courchane,
First Call, Haugen, Eddleman, and Hadford. Some but not all defendants were

dismissed in two cases, Sinclair and Big Sky. In Sinclair, the plaintiffs case was
dismissed with regard to those defendants whose summonses had not been issued within
one year. Similarly, in Big Sky, the plaintiff lost with respect to those defendants who
were improperly served under rule 41(e) and who raised this defense in a timely manner.
Plaintiff was permitted to proceed against the rest of the defendants, who failed to raise
the defense of insufficiency of service of process, thus waiving it, or who amended their
motion to dismiss to include that defense without permission of the court. In Shields,
plaintiffs default judgment was rendered void on Rule 41(e) grounds. Each of these
cases is discussed supraPart IV.A.
435. 188 Mont. 522, 614 P.2d 1020 (1980).
436. See State ex rel. Equity Supply Co. v. District Court, 159 Mont. 34, 494 P.2d
911 (1972).
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437
Administration are entitled to insist on the finality of litigation.

Justice Sheehy's dissent cogently presents the other view:
"We should therefore not kick him out of court on a procedural
point."438 The Supreme Court as a whole signed on to this more
merciful view in Larango, issuing a clear directive to the trial
court to allow amendment of the summons and to relate that
amendment back to the date of the original complaint "to insure
that this case is not dismissed for failure to comply with the
time requirements of Rule 41(e). . . -439 In Larango, however,
the foot-dragging was on the part of the trial judge, who had
failed to rule on several motions to amend the summons and to
reconsider its earlier ruling quashing a summons which counsel
had altered himself.440
While the sporadic treatment of Rule 41(e) by the Montana
Supreme Court makes any prediction tenuous, it does appear
that the court as a whole may have lost its taste for rigid
enforcement of the clear language of the rule. The last three
cases, late in 1998, 44 1 all reversed trial court rulings dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims for Rule 41(e) violations, allowing plaintiffs
far more latitude in obtaining and serving summonses than
previous cases had indicated. However, mercy is a recent
development. Counsel should not depend on it.
Rules must be enforced as written in order to promote a
systematic and just pretrial process, but the rules should not be
impossible or even difficult to follow. It seems especially harsh
to penalize clients for a violation of a rule which is so hard to
find and, judging from the number of cases it has engendered, so
hard to understand. One way to ameliorate this situation is to
make the rule easier to find and easier to understand once
found, resulting in much less attorney expense, court time,
danger to clients, and malpractice claims. Below, I compare
Montana's rule with the federal corollary and those in other
states and several tribes, and suggest a revision of Montana's

437. Rierson, 188 Mont. at 527, 614 P.2d at 1023.
438. Id. at 531, 614 P.2d at 1025.
439. Larango v. Lovely, 196 Mont. 43, 48, 637 P.2d 517, 520 (1981). See also
Brymerski v. City of Great Falls, 195 Mont. 428, 432, 636 P.2d 846, 849 (1981) (using
policy of trial on merits to overwhelm contention that plaintiff was not prosecuting
diligently).
440. See Larango, 196 Mont. at 46, 637 P.2d at 519.
441. See Quamme v. Jodsaas, 1998 MT 341, 970 P.2d 1049 (1998), supra Section
IV.A.24; Schmitz v. Vasquez, 1998 MT 314, 970 P.2d 1039 (1998), supra Section IV.A.23;
MacPheat v. Schauf, 1998 MT 250, 969 P.2d 265 (1998), supra Section IV.A.22.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

61

MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 2, Art. 2
LAW
REVIEW

346

Vol. 60

rule.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO RULE

41(e)

A. Sources
1. The FederalModel
Montana's Rules of Civil Procedure, by and large, mirror the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarity between the two
procedural systems is an avowed goal of the Montana
rulemakers.4 2 However, the two systems are very different
with regard to time limits for issuance and service of the
summons. The federal rule is lovely in its simplicity when
compared to Montana's syntactical nightmare.
First, the federal time limit for issuing and serving the
summons is appropriately located in Rule 4, with the rest of the
provisions on how to obtain and serve process. Second, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(m) has a clear and accurate title: "Time Limit for
Service." Third, the language of the rule is easy to understand
and follow. It provides:
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the
court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the
plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that
defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time;
provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the
443
court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

This clear and simple provision was added to Federal Rule 4
in 1983.444 The time line is unambiguous, as is the consequence
442. 'The intent and purpose of this act is to make possible the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so far as seems presently practicable to the existing
Montana Code to the end of uniformity, but not at the expense of existing procedural
statutory rules that may be better for Montana state practice." See Spaberg v. Johnson,
143 Mont. 500, 502, 392 P.2d 78, 79-80 (1964). This was the language used by the
Montana Civil Rules Commission in 1959 when it compiled and promulgated the
proposed Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. See Act of Mar. 13, 1959, 1959 Mont. Laws
606.
443.
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m).
444. "Congress enacted sweeping amendments to the procedures for service of
process in 1983." 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1137, at 383 (2d ed. 1987). "The 120-day limit on service endorsed
both by Congress and the Supreme Court reflects the modem trend of encouraging more
efficient litigation by reducing the time between the institution of an action and service
of process." Id. at 385. For these reasons, "Rule 4(j) attempts to harmonize the open-
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for failing to observe it: dismissal without prejudice as to that
defendant, thus allowing the plaintiff another chance to pursue
trial on the merits in another action against that defendant so
long as the statute of limitations has not expired.
The most litigated aspect of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) is the
determination of what constitutes "good cause" for an extension
of the time for service." 5 However, despite the potential
problems with defining "good cause" or the interplay of the time
limit with the statutes of limitations, this federal rule has not
caused any significant problem for lawyers who practice in
6
federal courts."
2. Other States
Of the 50 states in the union, 32, including Montana, have
7
rules of civil procedure based largely on the federal model." Of
these 32 states, 8 have deadlines for the issuance and service of
process identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m): the summons must be
8 Of
issued and served within 120 days of filing the complaint."
these states, the number of cases heard regarding the time limit
for service seems considerably lower than the number heard in
Montana regarding Rule 41(e)." 9
door policy of the federal court system and the mandate in Rule 1 for the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.
445. See id. at 391-95 & nn. 24-26; see also id.at 96-98 (Supp. 1999).
446. A Westlaw search for federal cases since, 1983, revealed 706 cases heard
around the nation, an average of 46 cases per year throughout the entire country.
447. "[MIany states have adopted a similar procedure in whole or in part." WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 444, § 1008, at 48. My research shows that the current list of such
states includes Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming.
448. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 4(j); ARIz. R. CIv. P. 4(i); DEL. R. Civ. P. 4(j); FLA R. Civ.
P. 1.070 (j); NEV. R. Civ. P. 4(i); R.I. R. Civ. P. 4(l); UTAH R. CIv. P. 4(a); W.VA. R. Civ. P.
4(k).
449. A search on Westlaw turned up only 12 cases on Delaware's Rule 4(j); 11 cases
heard in Utah on Rule 4(b); 6 on Arizona's Rule 4(i); 5 on Nevada's Rule 4(i); 4 on West
Virginia's Rule 4(k); and zero on Alaska's Rule 4(j). West Virginia recently changed its
time limit for service from 180 days to 120. See Annotations, W. Va. R. Civ. P. 4(k). The
rest of the West Virginia rule mirrors Federal Rule 4(m) and is written in the same clear,
concise style.
Westlaw turned up 44 published cases on Florida's Rule 1.070(j). Why so many?
Very likely it is because of the sheer volume of Florida's court system. Florida has "the
fourth largest state court system in the United States. Dockets are becoming more
crowded and cases are becoming more complex." Bill Rufly, Justice Addresses State
Legislature, THE LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Mar. 24, 1995, at 3B.
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Three states which are not "Federal Rules model states" per
se have also adopted rules imposing the same 120-day time limit
for service as the Federal Rule. 450 Other states have rules which
are similar to the Federal rule in clarity but allow plaintiffs
different amounts of time for service. 451 The Appendix shows
the time limit for service in each state. One state, Georgia,
requires service within 5 days of filing the complaint. South
Carolina allows only 10 days. Although the states' deadlines
vary, none is as syntactically byzantine as Montana's.
At least two states, Illinois and Texas, do not have set time
limits for service. For instance, in Texas, "[t]he mere filing of a
petition will not toll the running of a statute of limitation; to
interrupt the statute, the plaintiff must exercise due diligence in
procuring the issuance and service of citation upon the
defendant."452 In Perry v. Kroger Stores, nine months elapsed
between the time Perry filed her suit and the time she actually
served Kroger Stores. 453 Kroger Stores moved for summary
judgment arguing that the plaintiff had not exercised due
diligence in serving it. 454 The court found that "the lapse of time
and Perry's actions conclusively negate diligence,"455 and further
noted that six and a half months can establish a lack of due
diligence. 456 In one case, a complaint was dismissed because the
plaintiff had not served the defendant within 100 days of
457
filing.
450. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(i); Miss. R. Crv P. 4(h); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 306-b (McKinney
1998). A search on Westlaw turned up 25 published cases on Arkansas Rule 4(i) and 7
cases on Mississippi's Rule 4(h). As for New York, 151 cases turned up in a Westlaw
search for Rule 306-b. Like Florida's (see supra, note 449), the New York courts are
among "the largest and busiest in the world, with case loads that are all too familiar to
the legal community and demands on judges that are legendary." Jonathan Lippman,
Serving Justice:Needs of Public Must Be Met, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1996, at S1.
451. See, e.g, D.C. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (60 days); MASS. R. CIV P. 4(j) (90 days); MICH. R.
Civ. P. 2.102(e) (91 days); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 4(a)(2) (6 months); OHIO R. CIv. P. 4(e) (6
months); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2004(i) (West 1993) (180 days);
452. Perry v. Kroger Stores, 741 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App. 1987).
453. See id.
454. See id. Perry filed suit on October 11, 1984. Her petition had an incorrect
address for service of process for the defendant, Kroger Stores. A citation directed to the
wrong address was issued on October 11, 1984 and was returned, unserved. Perry did
nothing to effect service on the defendant until June 17, 1985. On June 17, 1985 she
requested that a new citation be issued. The citation was issued on June 19, 1985 and
Kroger was served on July 10, 1985. The court granted summary judgement to Kroger
based upon plaintiffs failure to effect timely service, holding that in order to toll the
statute of limitations, one must file and serve the summons.
455. Id. at 535.
456. See id. (citing Hamilton v. Goodson, 578 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)).
457. In Neese v. Wray, 893 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App. 1995), a district court judge signed
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Illinois also lacks a hard and fast rule governing the time
limit for a summons. Instead, the Illinois rule states that "[i]f
the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain
service on a defendant, the action as to that defendant may be
dismissed without prejudice, with the right to refile if the
statute of limitation has not run. The dismissal may be made on
the application of any defendant or on the court's own
motion."458 Thus the court must determine whether the plaintiff
was reasonably diligent in getting the summons served. 459 "(A]
trial court is given wide discretion to dismiss a suit under 103(b)
where plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining
service."460

The Illinois courts use seven factors when deciding whether
to dismiss an action for delay in serving the summons. 461 These
factors are: 1) amount of time in obtaining service; 2) plaintiffs
activities; 3) plaintiffs knowledge of defendant's whereabouts; 4)
ease in ascertaining defendant's location; 5) defendant's actual
knowledge of the pendency of the suit resulting from ineffective
service; 6) special circumstances affecting plaintiffs efforts; 7)
actual service effected on defendant. 462 In applying these
factors, the court reminded Illinois judges and practitioners that
"the rules of our supreme court are not aspirational," and that
this rule was adopted "to protect against unreasonable delay in
the service of process and to prevent plaintiffs' circumventing
the statute of limitations."463
In one case, the Appellate Court of Illinois found that a
lapse of thirteen months and six days between filing a lawsuit
and effecting service of process constituted lack of due
diligence. 46 Keeping an eye on the statute of limitations,
Illinois has dismissed cases where the delay between filing and
serving was as short as ten weeks and has accepted delays up to

a dismissal order about 100 days after the suit was filed because the plaintiff had not
served the defendant. The appellate court did not express any concern about the lower
court's dismissal.
458. ILL. S. CT. RuLE 103(b) (1998).
459. See, e.g., Green v. Heron, 635 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Bilerbeck v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 685 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Marks v. Donnelly,
636 N.E. 2d 825, 828-29 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
460. Marks, 636 N.E.2d at 829.
461. See Billerbeck, 685 N.E.2d at 1020.
462. See id.
463. Id. at 1020, 1022.
464. See id. at 1022-23.
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six years.465
Despite the differences in their rules governing the time
limit for service of a summons, each state seems to use these
rules for a similar purpose: to move litigation along and to
provide the defendant with timely notice, thus preventing stale
claims and lost evidence. Courts have been reluctant to allow
plaintiffs to abuse these rules as a way to "ice the statute of
limitations" 466 and deny the defendant the repose it confers.
Only one state, California, has a time limit for service as
long as Montana's; this should be no surprise because Montana's
statute first establishing the current system came to us from
California. 467 California's rule states:
(a) The summons and complaint shall be served upon a
defendant within three years after the action is commenced
against the defendant. For the purpose of this subdivision an
action is commenced at the time the complaint is filed.
(b)
Return of summons or other proof of service shall be
made within 60 days after the time the summons and complaint
468
must be served upon a defendant.

There is no separate deadline for the issuance of the
summons in California. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 582.250 sets forth the
consequences for violation of the three-year rule:
(a) If service is not made in an action within the time prescribed
in this article:
(1) The action shall not be further prosecuted and no further
proceedings shall be held in the action.
(2) The action shall be dismissed by the court on its own
motion or on motion of any person interested in the action,
whether named as a party or not, after notice to the
parties.
(b) The requirements of this article are mandatory and are not

465. In Illinois Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Makovsky, 689 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) the court said that "a dismissal with prejudice can only be entered when the
failure to use diligence in obtaining service occurred after the expiration of the applicable
statue of limitations." In this case, where the minor's statute of limitation had not run,
the court allowed a delay of six years. In another case, the Appellate Court of Illinois
upheld the dismissal of a case because of a ten-week delay between the expiration of the
statute of limitations and actual service. See Federal Signal Corp. v. Thorn Automated
Sys., 693 N.E.2d 418 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
466. Alvarez v. Meadow Lane Mall Ltd., 560 N.W. 2d 588, 591 (Iowa 1997).
467. See CAL. Civ. PROc. § 583.210 (West Supp. 1999). The three-year deadline for
service of summons first appears in MONT. CODE CIV. P. § 1004 (1895). Later legislative
histories list the California Civil Code as the source of the statute. See, e.g., MONT. REv.
CODE ANN. § 9317 (Smith 1921).
468. CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 583.210 (West Supp. 1999).
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subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly
469
provided by statute.

Thus, if the plaintiff fails to serve the summons within three
years, the plaintiffs case will be dismissed, no ifs, ands, or
buts.470 The only reason which would persuade the California
court to allow an extension of the time for service would be if the
471
defendant were "not amenable to the process of the court,"
472
meaning subject to service rather than convenient to serve.
California apparently believes that its deadline for service
helps prevent stale claims and lost evidence, similar to the
purpose of the statutes of limitation:
[Tihe nature and purpose of the three-year service of process
statute and the statute of limitations are virtually identical. A
statute of limitations serves to promote the public policy
of
473
furthering justice by precluding the assertion of stale claims.
Section 583.210 requires that the summons and complaint be
served on a defendant within three years of the commencement of
the action against that defendant. The policy of the dismissal
statutes is to promote trial of cases before evidence is lost and
memories dim and to protect defendants from being subjected to
the annoyance of unmeritorious actions that remain undecided for
indefinite periods of time. The specific purpose behind section
583.210 is to assure that defendants receive prompt notice of the
474
action.

Even California's similar rule has not produced the
apparent confusion and litigation engendered by Mont. R. Civ.
P. 41(e), 475 perhaps because it is more clearly written, perhaps
469. Id. § 583.250. The California courts construe this rule strictly because
subsection (b) curtails the courts' ability to excuse noncompliance with the rule.
470. In one instance, an attorney lied to her plaintiff-client, telling him that the
defendant had been served within the three-year limit. See Shipley v. Sugita, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 750, 751 (1996). In actuality, the defendant had not been served and the
plaintiffs case was dismissed. On appeal, the court found that the attorney's misconduct
did not qualify as an acceptable excuse which would give rise to an extension. See id. "If
the Legislature wishes to extend the circumstances under which mandatory dismissal
may be avoided, it may do so. To date, it has not." Id.
471. Watts v. Crawford, 896 P.2d 807, 812 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
472. The court decided that not being amenable to process meant "the
determination whether he or she is subject to being served, rather than to the reasonable
availability of that defendant for service of process." Watts, 896 P.2d at 815. Thus, a
defendant could conceivably hide himself away and still be considered amenable to
service.
473. Hennessey's Tavern, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 859, 863
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
474. Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 668, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
475. CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 583.210 corresponds to Montana's Rule 41(e). A Westlaw
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because there is no separate provision for issuing summonses, or
perhaps because the rule itself forecloses any mercy.
3. The Tribal Courts
While it is very difficult to research the deadlines for
issuance and service of process in civil cases in all the tribal
courts in the United States, 4 76 I did compare civil procedure
provisions in all seven tribal court systems in Montana as well
as the rules adopted by the Navajo and Cherokee Nations. The
seven tribal courts in Montana have extensive rules concerning
proper service of process. 477 However, none of them have a time
limit for service.
Of the nine tribal court systems I investigated, only the
Cherokee Nation established a specific time limit for service of
process, 478 and that by adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Title 12, ch. 1, the Cherokee Nation Code states
that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be used in the
Cherokee Nation Courts in all suits of a civil nature whether
cases at law or in equity unless superseded by a Cherokee
Nation rule of civil procedure."479 Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules
has not been superseded by a rule of civil procedure enacted in
the Cherokee Nation Code. Thus, in the courts of the Navajo
Nation, as in courts of the United States, the plaintiff must
serve the defendant within 120 days or risk dismissal without
prejudice.
B. Suggested Revisions
Montana's Rule 41(e) has proven difficult for the bench and
bar. It is out of line with the rules used in the federal system
search using "583.210" as the search term turned up 76 cases, only 50 of which dealt
with the rule in any meaningful way. In view of the volume of cases in the California
court system, this is obviously a far smaller issue in California than in Montana.
476. A current estimate is that there are 217 tribal court systems located within the
United States. See Gloria Valencia Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law,
24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 233 n.23 (1994).
477. See CODE OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSINIBOINE AND Sioux TRIBES OF THE FORT PECK
RESERVATION, tit. IV, ch. 1, § 102 (1989); FORT BELKNAP TRIBAL CODE, tit. II, Rule 12

(1979); CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES, ch. 1, § 5 (1980); CHIPPEWA-CREE
INDIAN TRIBE LAW AND ORDER CODE, tit. 2, ch. 2.2 (1987); CROW LAW AND ORDER CODE,
ch. 1, §§ 148-156 (1980); BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAw AND ORDER CODE, ch. 9, pt. II, Rule 12
(1980); TRIBAL CODE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE RESERVATION, tit. IV, pt. II, Rule 3
(1987).
478. See CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 12, ch. 1, § 1 (1993).
479. Id.
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and most other states. It is also out of line with its own purpose
that of encouraging diligence in the prosecution of a civil
lawsuit. It is time to erase this troubled tablet and start over
again with a rule about issuance and service of summons which
makes sense, which attorneys can understand and follow, and
which will help, not hinder, the trial process. To accomplish
this, Rule 41(e) should be replaced by a rule which is located in a
logical place, which is more clearly written, and which imposes
much shorter time limits.
-

1. Minimal Requirements
New Location
The Rule establishing time limits for the issuance and
service of the summons should be relocated to make it easier to
find. The most logical location for this requirement is as a
subpart to Rule 4, because this rule governs all other aspects of
the issuance and service of the summons. This relocation also
would realign the Montana rules with the federal rules and
those in many other states. At this time, Rule 4 has subsections
A through D; this new provision should become Mont. R. Civ. P.
4E. Subpart (e) of Mont. R. Civ. P. 41 should be deleted
simultaneously.
New Title
The new subpart should be given a title indicating that it
imposes time limits for particular events connected with the
issuance and service of the summons. This conforms with the
goal of Article V, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution, which
requires statutes to have titles which clearly express their
purposes. 48 0 The subtitle would also help practitioners find the
relocated rule. The clearest subtitle would be: "Time Limit for
Service of Summons and Complaint."
New Text
Montana's deadlines for the issuance and service of process
should be greatly simplified. There are two alternatives here.
480. See MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 11: "[Elach bill, except general appropriation bills
and bills for the general revision of the laws, shall contain only one subject, clearly
expressed in its title. If any subject is embraced in any act and is not expressed in the
title, only so much of the act not so expressed is void."
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First, Montana could elect to keep the same time frames and
simply rewrite the rule to clarify the deadlines and the
consequences for missing deadlines. Second, Montana could,
and in my view should, change the deadlines themselves to
dramatically shorten the time between filing the complaint and
serving the summons, thus providing the repose to the
defendant and prevention of lost evidence which is the purpose
of the statutes of limitation. This alternative has the added
advantage of spurring plaintiffs' counsel to action, to save
themselves from forgetting or at least procrastinating service.
2. FourSuggestions
Option 1: Simple Rewrite, No Substantive Change
Rule 4E. Time Limits for Issuance, Service, and Filing of Return
of Service of Summons and Complaint.
(1) The plaintiff is responsible for preparing the summons or
summonses, and then for having the clerk issue the summons
or summonses by signing and stamping the summons. The
plaintiff shall have a summons issued and shall direct it to
each defendant. The plaintiff must accomplish issuance of the
summons no later than one year from the date the complaint
is filed. If the plaintiff fails to meet this deadline with regard
to any defendant, and that defendant moves to dismiss 481 for
insufficiency of process under M.R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(4), the
plaintiffs complaint against that defendant shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
(2)(a) If, during the one-year period following the filing of the
complaint, the plaintiff amends the complaint to add new
defendants or identify defendants formerly named fictitiously,
the plaintiff must obtain a summons for each new or newly
identified defendant, also within the one-year period from the
time the complaint was filed and subject to the same
consequences for missing this deadline set forth in subsection
(1).
(b) If the plaintiff does obtain a summons within the one year
period established above, but the summons is misplaced or
destroyed any time during the three-year period before it must
be served, the clerk may issue a duplicate of that summons.
481. The requirement that the affected defendant move for dismissal to obtain the
protection of this rule is a change from the current version, which gives standing to "any
party interested therein, whether named in the complaint as a party or not." Excepting
the most recent case, Hadford v. Credit Bureau of Havre, 1998 MT 179, 962 P.2d 1198
(1998), supra Section W.A.21, in all the cases decided by the Montana Supreme Court,
the affected defendant raised the Rule 41(e) violation. There is no good reason to allow
other parties, much less non-parties, to enforce the rule.
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The duplicate summons will have the effect of complying with
subsection (1) so long as it is identical to the summons which
was issued within the one-year period.
(3)
In addition, the plaintiff is responsible for having the
summons and complaint served, for obtaining proof that such
service has occurred, and for filing that proof of service with
the clerk of court. The plaintiff must accomplish all three of
these steps no later than three years from the date the
complaint is filed. If the plaintiff fails to accomplish any of
these steps within the deadline as to any defendant, the
plaintiffs complaint against that defendant shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
(4) If the plaintiff violates the time limits set forth in this rule,
but the affected defendant fails to raise the violation as a
defense as set forth above, the defendant has waived that
defense and the action shall proceed as if this rule had been
complied with.

Option 2: Simple Rewrite, Omitting Deadline for FilingProofof
Service
The issuance and service of the summons are designed to
provide actual notice to a defendant. It makes sense to require
that these acts occur within stated time limits, to move the
lawsuit along. On the other hand, filing proof that the service
actually occurred rarely matters. (The only exception is when
the defendant has not responded and plaintiff wishes to take a
default. In this circumstance, the plaintiff must file the return
of service to prove to the court that the defendant was served).
Neither the federal rule nor the rules in other states require the
filing of the proof of service to meet any deadline. Indeed, the
Livingston court characterized this act as "ministerial," and
Haugen did not change this characterization. Haugen simply
held that the requirement was clear in the rule and should be
enforced until the rule was changed.
To avoid the trap identified in Livingston and Haugen, even
if Montana retains the one-year issuance, three-year service
rules, it should delete any deadline for the filing of return of
service. If this were done to the proposed amendment above,
subsection (3) of the rule would read:
Rule 4E. Time Limits for Issuance, Service, and Filing of Return
of Service of Summons and Complaint.
(3)

In addition, the plaintiff is responsible for having the
summons and complaint served no later than three years from
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the date the complaint is filed. If the plaintiff fails to
accomplish service within the three year time period as to any
defendant, the plaintiffs complaint against that defendant
shall be dismissed with prejudice.

Option 3: Major Simplification, FollowingFederalModel
The best option is to both simplify the wording of the rule
and dramatically shorten the time limits in the current version
of Rule 41(e). As the survey of rules in other jurisdictions
indicates, only Montana and California allow a plaintiff to file a
lawsuit and then linger for years before actually serving the
defendant and proceeding to trial on the merits. In the federal
system, many states, 4 2 and the Cherokee Nation, a plaintiff
must obtain and serve the summons within 120 days or less.
This change would realign Montana with the federal rule, in
accordance with the general policy behind Montana's Rules of
Civil Procedure. Further, this change would better accomplish a
stated goal of Rule 41(e)'s time limits: to encourage promptness
in the prosecution of actions. 48 3 Three years is certainly not
prompt, especially when added to the statute of limitations
period which may be up to as much as ten years. 484 As the
defendant in Sooy V. Petrolane Steel Gas485 complained, the
effect of permitting a plaintiff to postpone giving actual notice to
the defendant she has sued may be to lull the defendant into
repose too early, resulting in destruction by the defendant of

relevant evidence while the plaintiff, knowing of the existence of
the lawsuit, continues to hoard and increase her evidence. The
additional time is inconsistent with the purposes of the statutes
of limitation: to allow repose to defendants, and to prevent stale
evidence.
No Montana case has ever analyzed the reason for the large
amount of time granted to the plaintiff after the filing of the
lawsuit to achieve service. Indeed, when the Supreme Court
482. See infra Appendix.
483. See, e.g., Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 96, 399 P.2d 757, 759 (1965);
State ex rel. Equity Supply Co. v. District Court, 159 Mont. 34, 40, 494 P.2d 911, 914
(1972).
484. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-206 (1997) (setting shorter limits on actions
where injury can reasonably be known immediately and providing that "in no case may
the action [for legal malpractice] be commenced after 10 years from the date of the act,
error, or omission."); § 27-2-208 (setting ten-year limit on actions for damages arising out
of work on improvements to real property); § 27-2-214 (1997) (setting the statute of
limitations for actions for mesne profits of real property at ten years).
485. 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014 (1985), supra Section IV.A.9.
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refused to allow the Rule 41(e) time limits to apply to probate
proceedings, it specifically stated that three years to make
service "would place an unreasonable burden"486 on the
defendant. It is difficult to see any legitimate reason for what
turns out to be, from the defendant's standpoint, a three-year
extension on the statute of limitations. It is also hard to see
what detriment a plaintiff would incur from a shorter time
period. The plaintiff already is forced to gather facts and
prepare and file a complaint within the statute of limitations
period; adding the preparation and issuance of the summons at
the same time, and requiring service of the summons soon
thereafter does not significantly add to this burden.
Of course, there are circumstances when a plaintiff, despite
her best efforts, simply cannot identify a potential defendant
within the statute of limitations period and is forced to file
against a fictitious defendant in order to gain the discovery
advantages of formal litigation, the situation presented in
Sooy. 48 7 At the present time, the limits imposed by Rule 41(e)
curb the abuse of this statutory process by requiring the plaintiff
to identify the fictitious defendants in time to get the summons
8
issued within the first year after the complaint is filed.4 8 If
Rule 41(e) is changed to greatly decrease the time allowed for
the issuance and service of the summons, this amendment could
gut the fictitious name statute.489 This problem has a legislative
solution: rather than keeping an indefensible Rule 41(e), the
legislature should amend the fictitious name statute or the
statutes of limitation to provide for a stated extension of the
ordinary statutes of limitation, or of the ordinary time limit for
serving process, in fictitious name circumstances. Alternatively,
this provision could be inserted into the new Rule 4E.
The only really important event in service is the actual
service of process itself. Service on the defendant, not issuance
of the summons, gives notice to the defendant that he has been
sued and must respond within the stated period of time. It does
not matter whether the plaintiff obtains the summons on the
day she files her complaint or on the day she serves it, so long as
she gets the summons issued before it is served. Given the large
number of Montana's Rule 41(e) cases involving variations in

486.
487.
488.
489.

Werning v. McFarland, 149 Mont. 137, 139-40, 423 P.2d 851, 852 (1967).
See Sooy, 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014 (1985), supra Section 1V.A.9.
See id. at 423, 708 P.2d at 1018.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-31-405 (1997).
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the issuance process - lost, amended, duplicate, or substitute
summons issues - it makes sense simply to eliminate a separate
time limit for issuing the summons and concentrate instead on a
single limit for serving the summons.
Similarly, filing the return or proof of service is indeed
"ministerial"490 and does not further the lawsuit in any way. In
fact, the return is important only if the defendant does not
respond to the summons and the plaintiff seeks a default
judgment. The current requirement that the returned summons
be filed within a specific time frame has caused several of the
recent Rule 41(e) problems, without any countervailing
advantage. Therefore, this separate time limit should also be
eliminated in favor of a single deadline for serving the
summons.
A rule written with these concerns and objectives in mind
would read:
Rule 4E. Time Limit for Service of Summons and Complaint.
(1) The plaintiff is responsible for preparing the summons or
summonses, and then for having the clerk issue the summons
or summonses by signing and stamping each summons. The
plaintiff shall have a summons issued directed to each
defendant. The plaintiff is also responsible for having
the
491
summons and complaint served upon the defendant.
(2) If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint, the
court, upon motion of such defendant or on its own initiative
after giving plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard,
shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant
or direct that service be effected within a specified time;
provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for any failure,
the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate
period.
(3) A plaintiff who names a fictitious defendant in the complaint,
pursuant to M.C.A. § 25-5-103, may amend the complaint to
substitute a real defendant for the fictitious defendant within
one year of filing the original complaint in the action. The
120-day time period and other provisions set forth in
subsection (2) of this rule will begin to run, as to the newly

490. See Livingston v. Treasure County, 239 Mont. 511, 513, 781 P.2d 1129, 1131
(1989), supra Section V.A.11.
491. This subsection does not appear in the federal rule but clearly allocates the
responsibility for obtaining and serving the defendant, in accordance with the Montana
cases. The wording repeats MONT. R. Civ. P. 4C(1) to some extent; I believe this
repetition is helpful. The Civil Rules Commission's proposal eliminates this subsection.
See infra Section V.B.2, Option 4.
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identified defendant, from the date of the filing of the
amended complaint in which that defendant was first
identified.
(4) The time limit imposed by subsection (2) shall apply to all
lawsuits in which the original complaints were filed on or after
(the effective date of this subdivision E). The
provisions of M.R.Civ.P. 41(e), replaced by this subdivision E,
shall apply to all lawsuits in which the original complaint was
(the effective date of this
filed before
subdivision E).

Although this suggested provision drastically reduces the
time available to a plaintiff to accomplish service, there are
several mitigating features. First, the dismissal for failure to
serve the defendant within the allotted time is without
prejudice, as opposed to Montana's draconian dismissal with
prejudice for violation of the current 41(e). 492 This, alone, helps
move the lawsuit along without risking the policy of trial on the
merits. Second, a plaintiff who can show the court that he is
making reasonable efforts to serve the defendant, to no avail,
may obtain an extension of the presumptive time period. Thus,
this provision, while shorter than the current Montana rule, is
more flexible. Third, as with the second option set forth above,
this rule focuses on the important aspect of service, actual notice
to the defendant, and omits any deadline for issuance of the
summons or for filing the return of service. Last, but not least,
having the Montana rule the same as the federal counterpart
removes one temptation for parties to choose a court system
solely because of perceived procedural advantages.
Option 4: Civil Rules Commission Proposal
The Civil Rules Commission has recommended that the
Montana Supreme Court eliminate the current Rule 41(e) and
substitute a Rule 4E identical to Option 3 but without the first
subsection. The rationale is that the responsibility for obtaining
the summons and serving the defendant is already covered by
The Commission agreed that the subsection
Rule 4C.
specifically dealing with fictitious defendants was more
appropriately placed in the Rules rather than in the fictitiousdefendant statute. Thus, the Commission's proposal reads:
Rule 4E. Time Limit for Service of Summons and Complaint.
492. See First Call, Inc. v. Capital Answering Serv., Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 428, 898
P.2d 96, 98 (1995), supra Section LV.A.14.
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(1) If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint, the
court, upon motion of such defendant or on its own initiative
after giving plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard,
shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant
or direct that service be effected within a specified time;
provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for any failure,
the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate
period.
(2) A plaintiff who names a fictitious defendant in the complaint,
pursuant to M.C.A. § 25-5-103, may amend the complaint to
substitute a real defendant for the fictitious defendant within
one year of filing the original complaint in the action. The
120-day time period and other provisions set forth in
subsection (1) of this rule will begin to run, as to the newly
identified defendant, from the date of the filing of the
amended complaint in which that defendant was first
identified.
(3) The time limit imposed by subsection (1) shall apply to all
lawsuits in which the original complaints were filed on or after
(the effective date of this subdivision E).

The

provisions of M.R.Civ.P. 41(e), replaced by this subdivision E,
shall apply to all lawsuits in which the original complaint was
filed

before

(the

effective

date

of this

subdivision E).

Comments on the proposed revision should be directed to
the Montana Supreme Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Montana's Rule 41(e) is unmanageable in its current form.
It constantly threatens to deprive plaintiffs of their day in court
and defendants of their statutory right to repose. Rule 41(e)
must be replaced by a new rule setting out clear and short
deadlines for the initial steps of a lawsuit. Plaintiffs should be
able to consult a single rule, Rule 4, to determine how to obtain
a summons, get it served, and file the return of service. The
deadline for having the summons issued and served should be
reduced to 120 days from the filing of the complaint, thus
achieving conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and the practice
prevailing in other states, as well as the Montana policy in favor
of repose for defendants after the statute of limitations period
has expired.
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APPENDIX:
Time Limit in Each State for Service of Summons
Unless otherwise noted, the action in each state is
commenced and the statute of limitations is tolled when the
complaint is filed.
STATE

TIME LIMIT FOR SERVICE
OF SUMMONS

RULE

Alabama

30 days

ALA. R. Crv. P. 4.1(a)(4)

Alaska

120 days

ALASKA R. Civ. P. 4 0)

Arizona

120 days

ARIz. R. CIv. P. 4(i)

Arkansas

120 days

ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-58-134 (Michie 1987)

California

3 years

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 583.210
(West Supp. 1999)

Colorado

summons must be served within
10 days of filing complaint

COLO. R. Civ. P. 3(a)

Connecticut

12 days in superior court,
30 days in circuit court

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-46 (West 1991)

Delaware

120 days

DEL. SUPER. CT.
R. CIV. P. 4(j)

District of
Columbia

60 days

D.C. R. Civ. P. 4(m)

Florida

120 days

FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.070
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Georgia

Hawai'i

5 days

Vol. 60

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-4(c) (1993)

clerk must issue process when
HAW. R. Civ. P. 3;
complaint filed, but action not
HAW. REV. STAT.
commenced if process requested § 657-22 (1988); Heiser v.
to be issued "without any intent
Association of Apt.
that it should be served"
Owners, 848 F.Supp. 1482,
(D. Haw. 1993)

Idaho

6 months

IDAHO R. CIv. P. 4(a)(1)

Illinois

no set time limit; dismissal for

ILL. S. CT. RULE 103(b)

"lack of diligence"

Indiana

dismissal for failure to prosecute
if no action in case for a period

IND. TRIAL PROCEDURE
RULE 41 (E)

of 60 days

Iowa

90 days

IOWA R. CIv. P. 49(f)

Kansas

90 days

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-203 (1994)

Kentucky

service "in good faith"

KY. R. Civ. P. 3.01

Louisiana

90 days

LA. CODE CIV. PROC ANN.

art. 1201(C);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3471 (West 1991)

Maine

20 or 90 days

ME. R. Civ. P. 3

Maryland

60 days

MD. R. Cwv. P. CIR. CT.
2-113

Massachusetts

90 days
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Michigan

91 days

MICH. CT. R. 2.102

Minnesota

60 days

MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c)

Mississippi

120 days

MISs. R. Civ. P. 4(h)

Missouri

30 days, can be extended up to
90 days

Mo. SP. CT. RuLE 54.21

Montana

1 year to issue summons, 3 years
to serve summons

MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(e)

Nebraska

20 days

NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-507.01(1) (1995)

Nevada

120 days

NEV. R. Civ. P. 4(i)

New Hampshire

suit commences when writ is
completed with good faith
intent to serve; writ must also be
served and returned
by return date

Desaulnier v. Manchester
Sch. Dist., 667 A.2d 1380
(N.H. 1995)

New Jersey

60 days

N.J. GEN. APP. R.
1: 13-7(b)

New Mexico

dismissal for failure to take
"significant action" within 2

N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P.
1-041 (E)

years

New York

120 days

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 306-b
(McKinney 1998)

North Carolina

30 days

N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(c)

North Dakota

action commenced with filing of
complaint and service of
summons; statue of limitations
controls time limit for service,
+ 60 days

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01-38 (1991)
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Ohio

6 months

OHIO R. CIV. P. 4(E)

Oklahoma

180 days

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

§ 2004(I) (1993)
Oregon

action commenced with filing of

OR. REV. STAT. §

complaint and service of
summons; statute of limitations
controls time limit for service,

12.020(1), (2) (1998)

+ 60 days
Pennsylvania

30 days

PA. R. CIV. P. 401(a)

Rhode Island

120 days

R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P.
4(1)

South Carolina

10 days

S.C. R. Civ P. 5(d)

South Dakota

60 days

1997 S.D. Laws § 15-2-31

Tennessee

30 days

TENN. R. CIrv. P. 3

Texas

dismissal for failure to prosecute

TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(1)

case

Utah

120 days

UTAH R. CIv. P. 4(b)

Vermont

60 days

VT. R. Civ. P. 3

Virginia

after 12 months, the due
diligence standard applies

VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-275.1
(Michie Cum. Supp. 1998)

_

Washington

90 days

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.170 (West 1998)

West Virginia

120 days
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Wisconsin

90 days

365

WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 801.02(1) (Supp. 1998)

Wyoming

60 days
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